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INTRODUCTION
We who study and practice law in America are engaged in an
extended series of conversations and arguments about the law, and
those conversations and arguments are less easily understood, less
easily learned, less productive, less conclusive, and sometimes less
civil than we might think it reasonable to expect.
Those who are beginning their study of the law assume, quite
reasonably, that there is a set of operating rules that govern this
conversation. But they do not know those operating rules and, what
is worse, they cannot make them out. Making matters worse, their
teachers evidently believe that those rules are simple and self-evident,
and that they either need not, cannot, or ought not be explained.
When explanations are offered, perhaps in a course on legal
reasoning, they may prove far less useful than our students might
have hoped.
Those who have been around the law for an extended period of
time may describe the condition of legal discourse in different terms,
but many of us still find it unsatisfactory. We hear a great many
arguments in which it seems that people ought to be convincing one
another but, in fact, are not. We see arguments that fail to persuade,
disagreements that never end, and, all too often, partisans who
neither understand nor respect their adversary’s positions. It is
sometimes as if there were so many ships passing in the night. On
any given ship, there might be conversations in which issues are
joined and problems are solved, but as between those ships there is
barely any communication worthy of the name.
My purpose in this Article is to address these problems, first by
examining the structure of legal discourse and then by assessing the
nature of our differences. In this modest way, I hope to increase the
intelligibility of our continuing conversation and to shed some light
on the problems of argumentative inconclusiveness, mutual
unintelligibility, and, where it exists, mutual disrespect. I also hope
to ease the burden on those who are beginning their study of law, to
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expand the prospects for mutual understanding, to enhance regard
for our differences and for the great and unanswered questions on
which we are divided, and to enlarge the prospect of our actually
joining issue on those great questions.
I will describe the structure of legal discourse in terms of three
distinct and, as I would invite my readers to visualize it, horizontal
levels of discourse and disagreement. The upper-most of these three
horizontal levels of discourse contains all our discussions and
disagreements about rules, doctrine, and particular legal outcomes.
This is the level at which most of the work, and most of the teaching,
of law is done. It is also the level at which we find most of what is
unsatisfactory about legal discourse. The middle level is comprised of
the commitments we associate with various and conflicting “theories
of law.” I will describe our disagreements at this level in terms of six
discrete systems of belief, and I will suggest that it is those
disagreements that account for most of the dysfunctionality of the
arguments and explanations that go on solely at the level of rules,
doctrine, and policy.
Each of these second-level systems of belief rests in turn upon
certain basic assumptions, beliefs, and commitments.
These
assumptions, beliefs, and commitments are, in some important sense,
prior to theory, and it is these that comprise the third and most basic
of our three levels of legal discourse.
And, of course, our
disagreements at this third level do much to explain the intractability
of our differences at the (middle) level of legal theories and at the
(upper) level of rules, doctrine, and particular outcome.
Legal discourse can neither be understood nor learned as
something governed by a single and unified operating system. Thus
there is no such single thing as “legal reasoning.” Rather, legal
discourse is far more usefully seen as governed by six different
operating systems, each associated with one of the systems of belief
found at the second horizontal level of legal discourse—the level of
legal theory. Each of these second-level systems of belief corresponds
to a distinct community, each is governed by its own set of rules, and
each is in important ways inconsistent and incompatible with the
others. Thus, the problem we face is that of learning these six basic
and competing systems of legal discourse, together with the
commitments and the moves and countermoves with which they are
associated.
In the order in which I address them, the six
communities and operating systems are:
(1) Turn-of-the-century formalism of the kind associated with
Christopher Columbus Langdell and his Harvard Law School
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associates and with the constitutional jurisprudence of the Lochner
court;
(2) The legal realism that had its first flowering in the 1920s and
1930s, that is associated with the revolt against formalist
jurisprudence, and that exercises a broad and continuing influence
upon American law;
(3) The legal process school that arose in the early 1950s as a
reaction against certain of the more skeptical (proponents of legal
process would say nihilistic) aspects of legal realism, and that has a
continuing influence on our understanding of judicial review, as
well as constitutional and administrative law;
(4) The law and economics school that first came to prominence
within the antitrust community in the 1960s and that, ever since,
has been steadily expanding its domain;
(5) The legal positivist/analytic tradition, by which I mean the
continuous intellectual tradition that connects the work of John
Austin to that of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin; and
(6) Contemporary critical theory, which includes critical legal
studies, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory.
With only the rarest exceptions, all six of these systems operate
within what can fairly be called the master paradigm of legal
liberalism. Despite that point of common ground, there is an
enormous difference between the nature and quality of the
generally workable arguments that go on within any of these six
communities and the largely dysfunctional arguments that go on
between the members of one community and the members of
another. These communities are the ships that are passing one
another in the dark night of legal discourse.

If many of our differences at the upper level of rules, doctrine, and
policy may best be understood in terms of underlying differences at
the middle level of legal theory and systems of belief, it is equally true
that our differences at the level of legal theory are best understood by
reference to a third, and still more basic, level of differences. This
third level contains differences in assumptions, beliefs, and
commitments that are, in important ways, prior to theory. Among
them are differences with respect to
(1) assessments of the fairness and legitimacy of the existing
order, including the power, pervasiveness, and persistence of
illegitimate structures of domination based on class, race,
gender, or sexual preference;
(2) prime values and projects, as with the commitments of
the formalists to stability and their understanding of
economic liberty, of the legal realists to statutory reform and

1999]

SYSTEMS OF BELIEF

5

their understanding of the public interest, and of
contemporary critical theorists to their understandings of
democracy and equality;
(3) centers of activity and attention, as with the focus of
formalism and positivism on private law, of legal realism on
statutory reform, and of the legal process school on judicial
review;
(4) understandings of human nature, including among other
things, the thickness of the tissue of civility and the place of
reason in human nature;
(5) the nature and consequences of language, including among
other things the possibility of stable meaning and the
problem of indeterminacy;
(6) the nature of knowledge and of reason, including the
possibility of non-problematic foundations, of neutrality and
of objectivity;
(7) the relative autonomy of law and its relationship to other
academic disciplines, where we find legal realism affiliating with
the full range of social sciences, law and economics with just
one of those social sciences, the positivist/analytic tradition
with British analytic philosophy, and contemporary critical
theory with continental philosophy;
(8) interpretive strategies and forms of argument, as with the
penchant of the legal process school for interpretations
based on “institutional competence” and “neutral
principles,” of law and economics for those based on the
maximization of aggregate wealth, and of the
positivist/analytic tradition for those based on “principles
not policies,” “coherence” and “immanent rationality”;
(9) the possibility of the rule of law, of governments of law not
men, and of the separation of law from politics; and
(10) the consequences of critique, either of the possibility of
reason, the possibility of the rule of law, or the fairness and
legitimacy of the existing order.
It is from these most basic differences that flow our diverse
theoretical commitments, our divergent operating procedures, and
our most intractable disagreements—both at the level of legal theory
and at the level of doctrine and rules.
Each of the six second-level systems of belief is, as shall be shown,
distinguished by a distinctive set of underlying assumptions and
beliefs, prime values and projects, centers of attention, intellectual
affiliations, and styles of interpretation and argument. Each of these
six bodies of theory also has its particular strengths and weaknesses.
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Thus certain problems may be more easily “solved” within one
theoretical system than within others. Conversely, each of these
systems of belief has certain questions to which it has great difficulty
yielding satisfactory answers. The legal process school has, for
example, a comparative advantage over its competitors in generating
a satisfactory “theory of judicial review,” yet it has great difficulty
persuading others of the “neutrality” of its principles. Similarly, and
despite its manifold strengths, legal realism has a famously hard time
generating what the positivist/analytics would regard as a satisfactory
“theory of adjudication.” More generally, there is one weakness that
is common to all six operating systems. That weakness is this:
however satisfactory may be the conduct of business within each
system, the arguments that one system’s proponents offer for the
superiority of their system over its competitors often beg the question
and are almost always unpersuasive to those who are already
committed to the competing theory.
These six communities may also be distinguished from one
another in terms of their cultural location, historical occasion, and
historical adversaries. Our understanding of legal realism, for
instance, cannot be complete without an appreciation of its
adversarial relationship with turn-of-the-century formalism and with
formalism’s constitutional jurisprudence. Neither can one appreciate
the legal process school without reference to its historical occasion.
Nor can the legal positivist/analytic tradition be fully understood
without an appreciation of what is entailed in its relationship with the
British academic elite and, for instance, the fact that British
jurisprudence has developed largely without the stimulus provided, in
America, by judicial review and legal realism. Finally, it is also useful,
and sometimes necessary, to locate the six communities of belief in
relationship to a number of important historical markers, including
Lochner v. New York1 and its progeny, the New Deal, World War II and
the Holocaust, Brown v. Board of Education,2 the civil rights movement,
and the disruptions of the 1960s.
The test of this project is the degree to which it contributes to the
intelligibility of legal discourse. I believe these six operating systems
can be described in fairly simple terms and that, once described, they
are easily mastered. I also believe that the most intractable of our
differences can be readily understood, if not resolved, by reference to
these six communities of belief and to their differing assumptions,
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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beliefs, and commitments.
I do not wish to suggest that everyone either does or ought to fit
neatly into one or another of these six systems of belief. Some writers
fit none of them, some—and this is especially true of the
practitioners—work sometimes in one and sometimes in another,
while others even make a virtue of our being “incompletely
theorized.”3 But the great bulk of the conversation comprising
twentieth-century American law may fairly be said to fit somewhere
within one or another of these six perspectives. For example,
arguments from “the presumed neutrality of process-based solutions,”
or from “institutional competence,” “neutral principles” or
“purposive interpretation” can always be understood by reference to
the beliefs and assumptions of the legal process school. Arguments
from “free riders” and other “market imperfections” will always and
only operate by reference to the rules of law and economics. And
arguments from “coherence,” or “integrity,” or “immanent
rationality” must generally be understood in light of the teachings of
the legal positivist/analytic tradition. Similarly, arguments for law’s
indeterminacy always will invoke and carry forward the traditions of
legal realism and contemporary critical theory, just as proofs of law’s
legitimacy will always invoke and advance the work of this kind that
has been done in, among other places, the legal process school and
the legal positivist/analytic tradition. Thus what I will call the “great
divide” between the Grand Alliance of the Faithful and the League of
Skeptics (see the introduction to Section II below) seems likely to be
a stable and persistent feature of American law. Moreover, each of
these systems of belief has the virtue of making sense, at least on its
own terms; each can be learned; and, once they are mastered, the
intelligibility of legal discourse is greatly enhanced.
There are at least two groups who may have little or no
appreciation for a project of this kind. One includes those who
believe they are simply “doing law” in a way that is free from theory,
philosophy, or ideology. In response, I can only say that it seems
perfectly clear to me (though I can only offer this as an hypothesis)
that one cannot work or teach at the level of rules, doctrine, and
policies in a way that is free from the kinds of assumptions, beliefs,
and commitments that I have described as comprising the second
and third levels of legal discourse. Many can and do, of course,
proceed without any self-consciousness concerning their assumptions,
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733
(1995).
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beliefs, and commitments. But the absence of self-consciousness does
not, so far as I can tell, represent a condition of being free of—or
having transcended—the business of having, and of working from,
specifiable assumptions, beliefs, and commitments.
Similarly unsympathetic to this project are those who believe that
their particular system of beliefs is the one true perspective upon the
law. For this group, all one really needs to do is distinguish between
those who have gotten it right (them) and those who have gotten it
wrong (others). But even those who hold this view must also
acknowledge that a great many others see things differently and are
impervious to their persuasions. In the end, I expect even this group
to share my interest in the matters here under consideration, if only
to gain a better and more usable grasp of other people’s
misunderstandings.
Despite my own commitments in these matters, I have tried to
describe these various and competing systems of belief in a way that
would seem both recognizable and sympathetic to the people who
work within them. Where I fail in this attempt at sympathetic
description, I offer my apologies. But in any event, I share with Karl
Llewellyn the belief that “to classify is to disturb,”4 especially in
matters of this kind. I know from my days as an advocate that there is
nothing more persuasive than a seemingly “neutral” statement of the
facts. Knowing full well that there are other ways this story could be
told, I offer this not as the uncontestable truth but as my ordering and
as the result of my efforts to make sense of these matters. I hope it
may prove interesting, useful, and provocative of further discussion.
Section I of this Article discusses the six “second-level” systems of
belief—the theoretical perspectives or, if you like, the “operating
systems” that have dominated the last century of American law.
Section II takes up the nature of our differences as they exist at the
level of assumptions, beliefs, and commitments “prior to theory.” If
our differences at this level inform our disagreements at the level of
legal theory, our differences at both of these levels inform our
disagreements at the level of rules, doctrine, and policy.
I.

THE RANGE OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The six theoretical perspectives I will describe are, as I have
indicated, turn of the century formalism (subsection B below), legal
realism (subsection C below), the legal process school (subsection D
4. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
453 (1930).
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below), law and economics (subsection E), the legal
positivist/analytic tradition (subsection F), and contemporary critical
theory (subsection G). I begin, however, with a consideration of the
master paradigm within which, with only the rarest exception, all six
of these perspectives conduct their affairs. That master paradigm, of
course, is legal liberalism.
A. Liberalism: The Master Paradigm
At least as a general matter, all six of our “second-level” theoretical
perspectives share a commitment to a form of “liberalism” that
constitutes this master paradigm—the larger system of belief within
which the others all arise. The liberalism I have in mind is not the
twentieth-century political ideology that favors a level of state
intervention into the market somewhere between the lower levels
favored by political conservatives and the higher level favored by
social democrats. It is, instead, the older and broader movement that
might be called classical liberalism, a set of beliefs that includes both
the “liberalism” and the “conservatism” found in the politics of
twentieth-century America.
Specifically, I refer to the beliefs that: (1) the social universe is
comprised of individuals who are essentially independent and
autonomous of one another and who should be understood to preexist society and the state; (2) those individuals are by their nature,
and ought to be, free and, indeed, their liberty and autonomy may be
the first principles from which we ought to work; (3) among the most
basic rights, freedoms, and liberties that those individuals may hold is
the right of property and, within a particular realm, the right to
choose freely; and (4) the proper role of the state is to protect the
rights of these individuals and to provide a mechanism for the
mediation of their conflicting desires. This liberalism brings with it a
series of particular commitments. These commitments are, first, to
the discourse of rights; second, to a particular version of the rule of
law, which includes the separation of law from politics; and third, to
the idea that there is a public sphere and a private sphere, and that
the state may act legitimately within the public sphere but not within
the private sphere.5
This understanding of liberalism is related to, but broader than,
the nineteenth-century English liberalism that was incorporated into
5. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S.
1776); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1849); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
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classical and then neo-classical economics, and that we associate with
a particularly demanding form of laissez-faire ideology. In the same
way, it is related to but broader than twentieth-century versions of
strict laissez-faire ideologies that we associate with Friedrich A. von
Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and the Chicago School of Law and
Economics. As a result, we who are liberals in the broader sense may
regard certain “stronger” versions of liberalism as problematic and
contestable. But that assumption of contestability does not mean
that we ourselves do not embrace a “weak” version of liberalism as
natural and non-contestable. This weak version is, in fact, the sea in
which we swim. And with only a very small number of exceptions, all
of which are within the perspective I am calling contemporary critical
theory, all of the work I discuss in this Article is done within the
master paradigm of liberalism.
B. Turn-of-the-Century Formalism
The legal theoretical paradigm, if we may tentatively call it that,
which prevailed in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century
America is often described as “formalist”6 and is strongly associated
with two separate centers of activity. One was Harvard Law School
under the leadership of Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell.7
6. Primary material reflecting the work of this community is cited in the
subsequent notes. Secondary accounts include, e.g., Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for
1870: The American Law School, in PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 405 (Donald
Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought, 1850-1940, in
CURRENT RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1980); Robert W. Gordon, Legal
Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (G. Geison ed., 1983); Thomas C. Grey,
Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 931 (1992); WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994); Robert W. Gordon, The Case for (and Against)
Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231 (1995). Historically, the formalist community was
initially identified and named by their younger adversaries, the legal realists, often in
polemics directed against the formalists. See, e.g., JEROME N. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 48-56 (1935); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
7. Langdell’s publications include, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS (Little Brown
& Co. 1999) (1871); CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, DISCOVERY UNDER THE JUDICATURE
ACTS, 1873, 1875 (1898); Christopher C. Langdell, Patent Rights and Copyrights, 12
HARV. L. REV. 553 (1899); Christopher C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories,
12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1899); Christopher C. Langdell, Classification of Rights and
Wrongs, 13 HARV. L. REV. 537, 659 (1900); Christopher C. Langdell, Mutual Promises
as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 HARV. L. REV. 496 (1901); Christopher C.
Langdell, The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 16 HARV. L. REV.
539 (1903); Christopher C. Langdell, Northern Securities Case Under a New Aspect, 17
HARV. L. REV. 41 (1903); Christopher C. Langdell, Dominant Opinions In England
During the Nineteenth Century as to Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislating, or the
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There, the formalist project was embodied in the work of Dean
Langdell and a cadre of men who, for the most part, had been his
students and then his colleagues at Harvard. They included James
Barr Ames,8 Joseph Beale,9 and Samuel Williston.10 The other center
of formalist activity was the politically conservative wing of the U.S.
Supreme Court, comprised of Justices Rufus Peckham, Joseph
McKenna, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland, Pierce Butler,
and James McReynolds.11
Absence of it, During that Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151 (1906); Christopher C. Langdell,
Equitable Conversion, 18 HARV. L. REV. 1, 83, 245 (1904-05).
8. Ames’ writings include, e.g., James Barr Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12
HARV. L. REV. 515 (1899); James Barr Ames, The Vocation of a Law Professor, 48 AM. L.
REG. 129 (1900); James Barr Ames, Professor Langdell: His Services to Legal Education,
20 HARV. L. REV. 12 (1906); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97
(1908); James Barr Ames, The Origin and Uses of Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REV. 261 (1908);
James Barr Ames, Undisclosed Principal: His Rights and Liabilities, 18 YALE L.J. 443
(1909).
9. Beale’s major publications include, e.g., 1-3 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); JOSEPH BEALE, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916); JOSEPH BEALE, A SHORTER SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1941). He served as a reporter for the Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws in 1925 and 1939. He also published a number of treatises on the
measure of damages (1891), a treatise on the law of partnership (1893), criminal
pleading and practice (1896), foreign corporations and the taxation of corporations
both foreign and domestic (1904), innkeepers and hotels (1906), railroad rate
regulation (1907, 1915); published casebooks on criminal law (1894 et seq.), the
measure of damages (1895 et seq.), the law of torts (1900 et seq.), public service
companies (1902), carriers and other bailment and quasi-bailment services (1909),
criminal law (1894), municipal corporations (1911), legal liability (1915), federal
taxation (1915 et seq.), and taxation (1922 et seq.); and assembled an extensive
bibliography of early English cases.
10. Williston’s major publications include, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1919) (1894); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, SELECTED CASES AND STATUTES ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1915)
(1906); SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW
AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT (2d ed. 1909); SAMUEL WILLISTON, LECTURES ON
COMMERCIAL LAW AND THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (1913); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1979)
(1920); SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1940). Samuel
Williston was also the Reporter to the Restatement of Contracts, including tentative
drafts (1925 et seq.).
11. Rufus Wheeler Peckham, Jr., served on the Court from 1896 to 1909; Joseph
McKenna, from 1898 to 1925; Willis Van Devanter, from 1911 to 1937; George
Sutherland, from 1922 to 1938; and Pierce Butler, from 1923 to 1939. Those of this
group who were then on the Court all voted the formalist position with the majority
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (asserting that “liberty” includes
freedom of contract); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (same); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (same, re employment contract); Adkins v. Children’s
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (same, re anti-union provision in employment contract);
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1927) (defending Swift v. Tyson, which rests on assumptions
concerning the law that are consistent with those of the formalists); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (invoking the conceptual distinction between
“direct” and “indirect” in reading Commerce Clause); Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (asserting that “liberty” includes freedom of contract).
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The formalists clearly believed that the law was comprised of
principles—including definitions, concepts, and doctrines—broad in
their generality, few in their number, and clear enough to permit
answers to the questions of law to be more or less directly deduced.12
The formalists also believed that the law generally is, and should be,
unresponsive to particular factual contexts and circumstances. They
wrote as if such principles had an existence of their own, quite apart
from what judges or legislators might actually have said or done,13 and
that these principles were valid on grounds that were indifferent to
what we have come to see as either the needs of society or the
purposes that law might serve. Although such principles might
develop and evolve over time, they did not do so in accordance with
society’s changing needs.14 Neither were they influenced by custom
The same judges then took the formalist position in dissenting from Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), which recognized that liberty to conduct business has its
limits and may be subject to regulation; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (dissent asserting that “liberty” includes freedom of contract and asserting
unconstitutionality of state statute establishing minimum wage for women); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (dissent defended Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238
(1936) and its conceptual distinction between “direct” and “indirect”); and Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (dissent defending Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.1 (1842)
and its formalist assumptions concerning the law).
12. See Christopher C. Langdell, Preface to the First Edition of A SELECTION OF CASES
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (Little Brown & Co. 1999) (1871) [hereinafter
Langdell, Preface (1871)] (recognizing distinct doctrines of law and science).
The number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly
supposed; the many different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly
making its appearance, and the great extent to which legal treatises are a
repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension. If these
doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each should be found in
its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable in
their number.
Id.; see also Samuel Williston, The Work of Teachers of Law Affecting Its Development, in
SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW (1929) at 120 [hereinafter Williston, Teachers of
Law (1929)] (citing Langdell’s preface as the best statement of method, restating its
commitments); James Barr Ames, The Vocation of a Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129,
145 (1900) (arguing that the legal academic’s job is to search for “original
generalization, illuminating and simplifying the law”).
13. See, e.g., Langdell, Preface (1871), supra note 12, at vi; 1-3 JOSEPH BEALE, Preface,
to A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, at xiii-xiv.
14. See Langdell, Preface (1871), supra note 12, at vii (asserting that in the law of
contracts, a small number of important cases have contributed to the “growth,
development, or establishment of . . . its essential doctrines”); James Barr Ames, The
Vocation of a Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129, 140 (1900) (describing the legal
academic’s historical investigations into the genesis and development of legal
doctrine); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 99 (1908) (explaining
legal history as the evolution of legal rules to include equitable principles and ethical
concerns); Williston, Teachers of Law (1929), supra note 12 (asserting Langdell’s
disinterest in social desirability; Ames’ interest in desirability as expressed in his
understanding of justice and business convenience; and Williston’s view of stability
and simplicity as presumptively controlling aspects of social desirability, public
interest and good consequences); see also James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV.
L. REV. 97, 110 (1908) (“The law is utilitarian. It exists for the realization of the
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and practice nor by what people might “feel” to be “just.” Yet when
the formalists’ procedures seemed to fail, and the conceptuallyindicated result was simply intolerable, they were quite willing to
solve the problem through the invention of “legal fictions.”15 These
men believed that, in doing law as they did, they were engaged in a
“science” of “facts,”16 and that, notwithstanding the conceptual nature
of the relevant “facts,” their work and their results had nothing to do
with theories or philosophies of law. Thus Joseph Beale could argue,
in 1935, that:
They reckon falsely who think of the author as an exponent of a
school of legal philosophy. Philosopher he is none; nor need he
apologize for this fact in a book written for lawyers. One deals in
facts only. One studies decisions, which are facts of our law, and
the inferences from these, which after forty years of study and
17
teaching seem to be necessary.

At the same time, formalists were deeply concerned to establish the
law’s place within the university and their claim of “science” was
routinely put to that purpose.18
The academic formalists were strongly predisposed in favor of
“private” common law (the court-made law of, e.g., property,
contracts, and tort) and against public and statutory law. If they had
a “science,” it was a science of the common law. Their commitment
reasonable needs of the community. In context, this statement does not express a
general commitment to consequences and the changing needs of society.”); James
Barr Ames, The Vocation of a Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129 (1900) (asserting that
law should promote “the legitimate needs and purposes of men,” which refers to
their private purposes and not to such public purposes as might be expressed
through law); Williston, Teachers of Law (1929), supra note 12 (claiming that stability
and simplicity are vital to the public interest and as properly controlling until
offsetting disadvantages are clearly greater).
15. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (sustaining jurisdiction on the
basis of “consent” implied from use of roads); see also LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS
(1967) (reprinting three articles originally published in the Illinois Law Review in
1930 and 1931).
16. See Christopher C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 123
(1887) (“Law is a science . . . and all the available materials are contained in printed
books.”); James Barr Ames, The Vocation of a Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129, 130
(1900) (reflecting on the “steadily growing conviction, in this country, that law is a
science, and as such can best be taught by the law faculty of a university”); Williston,
Teachers of Law (1929), supra note 12, at 113, 122-23 (explaining the “scientific” study
of law); 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, Preface to A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, xiii-xiv
(1935) (stressing that “one deals in facts only”).
17. JOSEPH H. BEALE, Preface to A TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, at xiii-xiv (1935)
(claiming they are not theorists or philosophers but lawyers, theory has little to say to
practitioners); Williston, Teachers of Law (1929), supra note 12, at 119, 128 (asserting
that law teachers of his generation are pragmatists, see law as a practical profession,
and are distrustful of theory, philosophy, and speculative reasoning).
18. See Christopher C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 123,
124 (1887) (arguing that law deserves a place in the university because it is a science
and because it is best learned not from practice but from books).
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to private common law co-existed, perhaps inevitably, with a
commitment to the rights of private property, the freedom and
sanctity of contract, the priority of private over public interests, and a
resistance to legislative reform. For their part, the formalists on the
Supreme Court appear to have begun with their commitments to
laissez-faire, to the rights of property owners, and, at least
occasionally, to the interests of the industries they had served while in
private practice. It is from this starting point that they proceed to
their views on substantive due process, the contract clause, the
unconstitutionality of progressive legislation, and the formalist
judicial practices that supported their various commitments.
Formalism is exemplified in Dean Langdell’s handling of the
consideration in unilateral contracts (the flagpole case)19 and
bilateral contracts (the mailbox rule),20 and in his certainty that an
“irrevocable” offer is a “legal impossibility”;21 in Beale’s support for
the idea of a general common law as expressed in Swift v. Tyson22 and
in his certainty that the concept of domicile must be unitary;23 and in
Samuel Williston’s reliance upon the “syllogistic marshalling of
traditional concepts,” his failure to acknowledge cases granting
reimbursement for expenditures made in detrimental reliance, and
19. See CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1-4
(1880) (indicating that performance implies acceptance of an offer); see also Thomas
C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 15 (1983) (indicating that
Langdell’s formalist construction of the unilateral contract is demonstrated by his
view that an offer was revocable until the performance was fully completed).
Therefore, as in the flagpole case, A could offer B one hundred dollars if he will
climb to the top of a flagpole, wait until B nears the top, and yell “I revoke,” and in
Langdell’s doctrine, A would owe B nothing.
20. See CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 12-21
(1880) (asserting it to be in the nature of the concept of “consideration” that one is
bound as soon as an acceptance letter is mailed); see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s
Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
21. See CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 240-41
(1880) (explaining that the offer is an element of the contract and that the wills of
the contracting parties must concur at the moment of making); see also ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 11 (1982) (commenting
generally that certain facets of the law are characterized as “instrumentalistic and
pragmatic”).
22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). The decision was written by Justice Story and
long precedes what I would count as the beginning of turn-of-the-century formalism.
Story’s opinion appears to reflect formalist commitments, but may do so only
superficially. Thus he writes that state judicial decisions “are, at most, only evidence
of what laws are; and are not of themselves law.” Id. Story may never have
understood the law to be “transcendental” or a “brooding omnipresence.” See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118 n.19 (1978). But those who
in the early twentieth century defended Swift against Justice Holmes in Black & White
Taxicab (1922) and against Justice Brandeis in Erie (1937) almost surely did so as an
expression of their formalist commitments.
23. See JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 92-94 (1935)
(asserting that domicile had, over 150 years, become a unitary concept).
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his inattention to the purposes the law might serve.24 Among the
members on the Court, formalism was manifest in their elaboration
and defense of Pennoyer v. Neff,25 in their opposition to the reversal of
Swift v. Tyson in Erie v. Tompkins,26 and in the positions they took in
the debates over substantive due process27 and the Commerce
Clause.28 Formalism’s lasting contributions are the great treatises
written by Professor Williston and his colleagues, including the
“string cites” found in the footnotes for which they were justly
famous, and the Restatements of Law29 and the Uniform Law
24. See Lon L. Fuller, Williston on Contracts, 18 N.C. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1939)
(discussing Williston’s approach to contracts and discussing Williston’s disregard of
“social interests” and “policy” in his approach to contracts).
25. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court’s formalist elaboration of Pennoyer includes its
decisions in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), which based jurisdiction on the
fictitious claim that a debt “is present” wherever a debtor’s debtor is found and Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1927), which refers to decisions in Pennoyer, which
held that notice sent outside of a state to a nonresident would not establish
jurisdiction in the instant case on a fictitious “implied consent.” This regime,
together with all its epicycles, was finally abandoned in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). Swift rests on the assumption that there exists
some arguably transcendental “general federal law” that the federal courts, sitting in
diversity cases, could apply in place of the common law of the states. The formalists
on the Court defended Swift in Black & White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1922) and then dissented from the
Court’s abandonment of Swift in Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in which
Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented.
27. In the early twentieth century, numerous Supreme Court decisions held that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protections’ of “life, liberty or property”
unproblematically included the politically conservative laissez-faire concepts of
marketplace “liberty” and “freedom of contract.” See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897) (finding “liberty” includes freedom of contract); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hours law); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating law forbidding employment contracts that prohibit
membership in a union, or “yellow dog” contracts); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating law setting minimum wages for children). This
conceptualist doctrine was challenged in Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 433 (1926), and was then abandoned by
the Court in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), which upheld legislation
designed to control the price of milk, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937), in which the Court upheld minimum wage laws for women.
28. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (arguing from
the conceptualist distinction between “direct” and “indirect”), with NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 29 (1937) (rejecting that conceptualist distinction).
29. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 58-59, 67-68, 100-01 (1974)
(describing the Restatements as collections of fundamental principles of common
law); Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961)
(discussing the distinguished membership of the American Law Institute and its
attempt, through the Restatements, to mold common law into statutory form);
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 872-73 (1977) (describing the
Restatements project as Langdellian); William D. Lewis, History of the American Law
Institute and the First Restatement of the Law: “How We Did It,” in RESTATEMENT IN THE
COURTS 3 (1945); Report of the Commission on the Estimation of a Permanent Organization
for the Improvement of the Law Proposing an American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1
(1923).
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initiatives.30
C. Legal Realism
American legal realism is an intellectual movement that flowered
in the 1920s and 1930s, and that has given lasting shape to the way
Americans think about the law.31 The movement was anticipated and
in certain ways begun by Oliver Wendell Holmes,32 Roscoe Pound,33
and Benjamin Cardozo.34
Later practitioners included Karl
Llewellyn,35 Felix Cohen,36 Jerome Frank,37 William O. Douglas,38 John
30. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1991)
(providing a history of the efforts to modify the different legal traditions of the 50
states and discussing Williston’s contributions to the Uniform Law initiatives,
including the authorship of the Uniform Sales Act, Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, Uniform Bills of Lading Act, and Uniform Stock Transfer Act).
31. Primary material reflecting the work of this community is cited in the
subsequent notes. Secondary treatments include, e.g., WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR.,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968);
Edward A. Purcell, American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis
of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424 (1969); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
(1977); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986); Joseph Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 466 (1988); JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995); Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A
Century of Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215 (1996). For a discussion
linking legal realism with pragmatism, instrumentalism, progressivism, see MORTON
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA (1947).
32. Holmes’ major publications include, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW (1881); Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897);
Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899). For
secondary material regarding Holmes, see Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Neil Duxbury, The Birth of Legal Realism and
the Myth of Justice Holmes, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 81 (1992).
33. Pound’s writings include, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?,
5 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1905); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19
THE GREEN BAG 607 (1907); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605 (1908); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Roscoe Pound, The
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912); Roscoe
Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923); Roscoe
Pound, The Call for A Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931) (discussing
realist jurisprudence and its validity as a movement); Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the
Law: Analytical Jurisprudence, 1914-1927, 41 HARV. L. REV. 174-99 (1928) (discussing
two distinct theories on jurisprudence since 1914–analytical apositivist and
philosophical sociological).
34. Cardozo’s major publications include, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CRADOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW (1924); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928).
35. Llewellyn’s major works include, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism–-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Karl
Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Karl
Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 653
OF THE
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Dewey,39 Underhill Moore,40 and others.41 Historically, legal realism
(1935); Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341
(1937); Karl Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243
(1938); Karl Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L.
REV. 581 (1940); KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); Karl Llewellyn, On the
Good, the True, and Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942). For a collection of
his essays, see KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960); KARL
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962). For his
treatises and casebooks, see KARL LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
SALES (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1946). Lastly, for a
biography, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
(1973).
36. Cohen’s publications include, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal
Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS:
AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1933); Felix S. Cohen, Modern
Ethics and the Law, 4 BROOK. L. REV. 33 (1934); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Felix S. Cohen,
The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5 (1937); Felix S. Cohen,
Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950). For a collection of previously
published essays by Felix Cohen, see THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF
FELIX S. COHEN (Lucy Cohen ed., 1960).
37. Frank’s writings include, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931); Jerome Frank,
Review of The Bramble Bush by Karl Llewellyn, 40 YALE L.J. 1123 (1931); Jerome Frank,
What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645 (1932); William O. Douglas & Jerome
Frank, Landlord Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003 (1933); Jerome Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); JEROME FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). For a discussion of Frank’s
legacy, see ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S
IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985); Neil Duxbury, Jerome Frank and the Legacy of Legal
Realism, 18 J.L. SOC’Y 175 (1991).
38. Douglas’ publications include, e.g., William O. Douglas & Caroll M. Shanks,
Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193-218 (1929);
William O. Douglas & J. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration
and Some Suggestions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 25 (1932); William O. Douglas, Some
Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329 (1932); William O. Douglas, Wage
Earner Bankruptcies—State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591 (1933); William O.
Douglas & Jerome Frank, Landlords’ Claim in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003 (1933);
William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REVIEW 521-33 (1934); DEMOCRACY
AND FINANCE: ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS (James
Allen ed., 1940); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS
(1974); WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975 (1980).
39. Dewey’s legal writings include, e.g., John Dewey, Nature and Reason in Law, 25
INT’L J. ETHICS 25 (1914); John Dewey, Force, Violence, and Law, 5 THE NEW REPUBLIC
295 (1916); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1925); JOHN
DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1929); JOHN DEWEY, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 71, 76
(1941).
40. Moore’s major writings include, e.g., Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal
Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923); Underhill Moore & T. Hope, An
Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929);
Underhill Moore & G. Sussman, The Lawyer’s Law, 41 YALE L.J. 566 (1932); Underhill
Moore & G. Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct
Discounts, 40 YALE L.J. 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219 (1931); Underhill Moore, Law
and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943). For a discussion
of Moore’s influence, see John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980).
41. See W.W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. 303 (1927); THURMAN
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935); THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF
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may be understood as a part of the political opposition to the static
and politically conservative jurisprudence of turn-of-the-century
formalism, as a part of the early twentieth-century “revolt against
formalism” that manifested itself in a wide range of disciplines,42 as
incorporating into the law the insights and instincts of American
philosophical pragmatism,43 and as an attempt to bring to bear on the
law a wide range of social sciences including, among other
disciplines, sociology and psychoanalysis. Its lineal descendants
include contemporary proponents of “law and social science,” “law
and economics,” and “critical legal theory.”
Legal realism is characterized by various forms of skepticism about
the rule of law as it was understood from what had become the
orthodox perspective and by a commitment to the demystification of
the law in general and of the work of the courts in particular. These
include skepticism about reasoning, especially “legal reasoning”;44
skepticism about concepts and conceptual thinking;45 claims
CAPITALISM (1937); Max Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 824 (1931); Hessel
E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (1931); Hessel E.
Yntema, Legal Science and Reform, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 207 (1934); Hessel E. Yntema,
Jurisprudence on Parade, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1154 (1941); GLENDON SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING (1963); GLENDON SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH (1964); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED:
PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); see also Lon L. Fuller,
American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Myers McDougal, Fuller v. the
American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 828 (1940).
42. See MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST
FORMALISM 11-31 (1947); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY 33 (1982) (noting that pragmatists were antiformalistic).
43. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897);
Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908); John
Dewey, Logical Method and the Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1925); JOHN DEWEY, MY
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 71, 77 (1941); see also
EDWARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); DAVID WIGDOR,
ROSCOE POUND 185 (1974); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977);
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 30-33 (1982);
JAMES KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 (1986); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 956-58 (1987); Thomas C.
Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); ROBERT B.
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991); MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 200 (1992).
44. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-77
(1921) (asserting the relevance of the subconscious judicial mind); John Dewey,
Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1925); Herman Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive:
The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108-09 (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); FRED RODELL, NINE MEN:
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 (1955).
45. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 23 (1925)
(“[M]en do not begin thinking with premises.”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
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concerning the indeterminacy of legal texts46 and the indeterminacy
of judicial facts;47 a critique of the public-private distinction;48 a
critique of the consent-coercion distinction as found in the law of
contract;49 and a critique of the supposed determinacy of the
legislative histories.50 Together, these skepticisms contribute to
sustained critiques both of claims concerning the separation of law
from politics51 and of claims for that strong version of the rule of law
in which we are said to be governed not by men but by laws.52
Legal realism is also characterized by a number of affirmative
commitments, all of which can be understood in one way or another
as commitments “to the facts.” These include a desire to separate “is”
from “ought”;53 to distinguish “real rules” from “paper rules”;54 to
attend not to what the courts are saying but to what they are doing;55
and to understand the law in a way that will permit us to predict what

MODERN MIND 108-11 (1930) (arguing that judges work backwards from their
conclusions); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY & PRACTICE,
56, 58 (1962) (explaining the theory of rationalization).
46. See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928); Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69
(1951); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, A Selection of Available Impeccable Precedent Techniques, in
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 77-91 (1960).
47. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
3-4, 168-69 (1949); see also WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM:
SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968) (defining fact skepticism).
48. See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 11 (1928)
(discussing the distinction between sovereignty, a public law concept and property, a
private law concept); Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 58592 (1933) (indicating that enforceability of a contract by the government gives
contract law a public element); Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); see also Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 465 (1988).
49. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909); Walter
Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1918);
Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470 (1923); Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 569 (1933);
Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943);
see also Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 482-87 (1988).
50. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
51. See FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955 (1955).
52. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1951);
Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928). But see Joseph C.
Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decisions,
14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6 (1930);
FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO
1955, at 6-7 (1955).
53. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
439-43.
54. See id. at 439.
55. See id.
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courts will do.56 Legal realists’ commitment to the facts also include
the beliefs that particular facts may be more important to the
outcome of a litigated case than the general rule the court
pronounces;57 that the justification for laws is to be found in the
(factual) consequences they produce;58 and that the law is an
institution that should evolve in ways that are responsive to the
changing (factual) needs of the society it serves.59
The legal realists may also be understood in terms of certain
systematic “credulities.” These pertained to the possibilities of
empiricism,60 and to various forms of expertise associated with those
social sciences;61 to the idea that there is an ascertainable public
interest;62 to the possibility of “balancing” interests;63 and to the
56. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897);
Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, The Lawyer’s Law, 41 YALE L.J. 566 (1932); Lee
Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1949).
57. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 64 (1974); GRANT GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 80 (1977).
58. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 468-69
(1897); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (Pt. 3), 25
HARV. L. REV. 489, 510-16 (1912); Walter Wheeler Cook, Scientific Method and the Law,
303 A.B.A. J. 303, 308 (1927); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism:
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223, 1236, 1237 (1931); Felix
Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MODERN L. REV. 5, 18-24, 25
(1937); John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 71, 84 (Julius Rosenthal Foundation ed., 1941).
59. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881) (asserting that law evolves
in accordance with the felt necessities of the time).
60. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995); ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW (1978);
HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1935) (observing the
connection between sociology and the law, and how realists such as Holmes used
sociological methods such as statistics in analyzing the law).
61. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-77 (1921)
(discussing the discovery of the subconscious judicial mind); JEROME N. FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (psychoanalysis); THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT (1935) (economics); THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM
(1937) (economics); KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY
(1941) (providing an example of anthropological studies); HAROLD LASSWELL, POWER
AND
PERSONALITY 94-107 (1948) (psychoanalysis); HAROLD LASSWELL,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS (1930) (psychoanalysis).
62. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, at 461-64 (1930).
63. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921)
(noting that comparative importance or value of social interests are considered in
shaping the law); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Social Interests (1921), published as A
Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1943) (recognizing the law’s attempt
to harmonize and balance competing interests); Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common
Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1936) (noting that “resourcefulness
and insight with which judges and lawyers weigh competing demands of social
advantage . . . in determining whether precedents shall be extended or restricted,
chiefly give the measure of the vitality of the common law system and its capacity for
growth”). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 948-72 (1987) (providing a history of balancing interests
in the law).
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general project of statutory reform.64 And finally, the legal realists
may be understood in terms of their commitments to progressive
legislation, to the work of the New Deal, and to the removal of the
judicial and constitutional impediments to those political projects.
D. The Legal Process School
The “legal process school”65 dominated the American legal
academy for perhaps twenty-five years beginning around 1950. It was
the work of a generation that came of age under the influence of
Hitler, fascism, Pearl Harbor, Dachau, Hiroshima, the exhaustion of
the western European democracies, the eastern European
“revolutions,” and the simultaneous threats of communism abroad
and McCarthyism at home—and under the influence of the distinctly
1950s belief that ours was a society that had moved, or certainly could
move, “beyond ideology.”66 The legal process school was affected
strongly by the thought, temperament, and mentorship of Felix
64. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974); PETER H.
IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
65. Primary material reflecting the work of this community is cited in the
subsequent notes. Secondary treatments include, e.g., G. Edward White, The
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REV. 279 (1973); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 70 CAL. L. REV. 465, 50507 (1988); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
247-68 (1992); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 602 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge &
Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958)].
A number of critiques of this approach, chiefly by proponents of legal realism and
contemporary critical theory have been written. See Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s
Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960); Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial
Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1959); Duncan Kennedy,
Utopian Rationalism in American Legal Thought (June 1970, a student paper written at
Yale Law School for Harry Wellington) (on file with author); J. Skelly Wright,
Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 772
(1971); Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 664 (1960); Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV.
1307-08 (1979); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981);
Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Gary Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1182-87 (1985); Gary Peller, Neutral
Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 565 (1988); Kimberle Crenshaw &
Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1683 (1998).
66. See DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL
IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1960); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL
BASES OF POLITICS 406, 408 (Anchor Books ed., 1963) (1960); Seymour Martin Lipset,
A Concept and Its History: The End of Ideology, in CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 81 (1985).
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Frankfurter,67 by the political writings of Walter Lippman,68 and, near
the mid-point of its development, by Learned Hand’s reservations
about the legitimacy of judicial review.69 Early members of the legal
process school included Henry M. Hart,70 Albert Sacks,71 Herbert
Wechsler,72 Alexander Bickel,73 Gerald Gunther,74 Harry Wellington,75
67. Frankfurter’s writings include, e.g., The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA.
L. REV. 614 (1927); THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); FELIX FRANKFURTER &
JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927); FELIX FRANKFURTER &
NATHAN GREENE, LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
GOVERNMENT (1930); CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (Felix Frankfurther & Wilber G. Katz eds., 1931); FELIX FRANKFURTER & J.
FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1935); MR.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932). See also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX
FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES (1991).
Frankfurter’s academic writings represent only a part—and perhaps a small part—
of the contributions he made to this movement. Other contributions include his
teaching, his mentoring (especially of his clerks), and the opinions he wrote while
serving on the Supreme Court. See infra note 79.
68. See WALTER LIPPMAN, INQUIRING INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD SOCIETY
(1937); WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955); see also RONALD STEEL,
WALTER LIPPMAN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1980).
69. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1960) (Holmes’ lectures at Harvard
Law School, delivered on Feb. 4, 5, and 6, 1958).
70. Hart’s writings include, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Holmes’ Positivism—An
Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1951); Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); HENRY M.
HART, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953) (later editions with
Herbert Wechsler); HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65.
71. Sack’s writings include Albert Sacks, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1953 Term,
68 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1954); HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65.
72. Wechsler’s publications include, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); HENRY M. HART & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Paul M. Bantor et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1998); HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
(1961); HERBERT WECHSLER, THE COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1965); HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (1970). For a discussion
regarding Wechsler, see Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles”
in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854
(1993).
73. Bickel’s writings include, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry
H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Forward:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1962)
[hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)]; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978).
74. Gunther’s works include, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive
Virtues:” A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1964); GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (various
editions from 1965 to 1997); GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1986); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (1984); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
75. Wellington’s writings include, e.g., Harry Wellington & Alexander M. Bickel,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1
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Philip Kurland,76 and a handful of others,77 as well as, some years
later, Antonin Scalia.78 All members of the original group were
closely associated with Felix Frankfurter or Henry Hart, Harvard Law
School, and the Harvard Law Review.79 The lasting contribution of
(1957); HARRY H. WELLINGTON & HAROLD SHEPHERD, CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1957); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968); HARRY H. WELLINGTON & CLYDE SUMMERS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (1968); HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE
UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1972); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973);
Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982); HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990).
76. Kurland’s publications include, e.g., Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963
Term—Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 165 (1964); Philip Kurland, Earl
Warren, the “Warren Court,” and the Warren Court Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968);
Philip Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19 (1969); Philip
Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 682 (1970); PHILIP
KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); Philip Kurland &
Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
628 (1983); Philip Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the “Doctrine” of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986); Philip Kurland, Judicial Review Revisited: “Original Intent”
and “The Common Will,” 55 U. CINN. L. REV. 733 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Louis Jaffe, Foreword to the Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REV.
107 (1951); Erwin Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959—Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes,
Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960); Philip Elman, Rulemaking
Procedures in the FTC’s Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1964);
Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Archibald Cox, Congress v. The
Supreme Court, 33 MERCER L. REV. 707 (1982); Paul Carrington, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 (1989).
An account of the legal process school would be incomplete without mention of
Lon L. Fuller, who taught at Harvard from 1939 until 1970. Fuller might best be
understood as being affiliated, simultaneously, with the legal process school and with
the legal positivist/analytic tradition. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism,
82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940)
(espousing purposive interpretation); Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949) (espousing purposive interpretation); Lon L.
Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEG. ED. 457 (1954) (discussing
purposive doctrine); see also ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984).
78. Justice Scalia’s academic writings include, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as
Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v (1982); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). Justice
Scalia has, of course, made a further contribution in the form of his published
opinions.
79. Felix Frankfurter served on the faculty of the Harvard Law School from 1913
until he was appointed to fill Justice Brandeis’ seat on the Supreme Court in 1939, a
post he held until 1962. There is then a core group of seven that includes Hart,
Sacks, Wechsler, Bickel, Gunther, Wellington, and Kurland. Five of these seven
(Hart, Sacks, Bickel, Wellington and Kurland) graduated from the Harvard Law
School and served on the Harvard Law Review (Hart, Sacks, and Kurland as
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the legal process school, and the area of its greatest interest, involved
the theorizing of judicial review80 and numerous related
developments in constitutional81 and administrative law,82 as well as
Presidents) and either served as a junior co-author with Frankfurter before he was
appointed to the Court (Hart) or clerked for him after his appointment (Sacks,
Bickel, Wellington, and Kurland). A sixth (Gunther) graduated from the Harvard
Law School, served on the Law Review, but did not clerk for Frankfurter. Only the
seventh (Wechsler) neither went to Harvard, served on the Law Review, nor clerked
for Frankfurter; he did, however, discover his commitments to “legal process” while
serving as a visiting member of the Harvard faculty. It is not until the mid-sixties,
when legal process was less of a movement than simply a style of thought, that John
Hart Ely finally broke the mold. He did not attend Harvard, did not serve on the
Harvard Law Review, did not clerk for Frankfurter, and did not teach at Harvard.
Rather, he graduated from Yale—where he studied under Bickel and Wellington.
80. Much of the literature of the legal process school may be read as a series of
responses to Learned Hand’s attack on the legitimacy of judicial review, presented as
the Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law School on February 4-6, 1958, and
published as LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1960). See Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Alexander
M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1961); BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73. Their
defense of judicial review was more expansive than that suggested by Hand and,
before him, by James B. Thayer in The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). It was, at the same time, highly
critical of what it saw as the excessive judicial activism of the Warren Court.
81. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1952); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry W. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1959);
Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959—Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—Professor
Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme
Court, 1960 Term—Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73; Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the “Passive Virtues:” A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1964); Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Foreword: “Equal in
Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78
HARV. L. REV. 143, 165 (1964); Philip Kurland, Earl Warren, the “Warren Court,” and the
Warren Court Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968); Philip Kurland, Toward a Political
Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19 (1969); Philip Kurland, Egalitarianism and the
Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629 (1970); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); HARRY W. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990);
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
(1991); see also GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(numerous editions).
82. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1932); Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U.
PA. L. REV. 614 (1927); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); LOUIS
L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1953); JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENTELECT (1960); Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 319 (1964); Philip Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC’s Enforcement of the
Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1964); ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
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statutory interpretation.83
This school of thought reflects both a powerful reaction against the
deeper skepticisms of legal realism and a deep concern for the life—
literally the survival—of our institutions.84 Witnesses and participants
in America’s mid-century battles first with fascism and then with
communism, members of this group hold a distinctive belief in the
fragility of democratic institutions and what I would call the thinness
of the tissue of civility.85 Accordingly, they exhibit an urgent faith in
RULE-MAKING (1986).
83. See, e.g., notes 93 as to plain meaning, 102 as to purposive interpretation, and
103 as to legislative intent.
84. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 73-84
(condemning “neo-realists” like Thurman Arnold for their “nihilism,” their “selfvalidating cynicism,” and their lack of respect for the deliberative process); Lon L.
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1962); see also G.
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
85. Sir Howard Beale recounts Felix Frankfurter’s response, in 1962, to the
passage in Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons in which Bolt’s Thomas More declares
And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned on you – where would
you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? (He leaves him) This country’s planted
thick with laws from coast to coast – man’s laws, not God’s – and if you cut
them down – and you’re just the man to do it – d’you really think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I’d give the
Devil the benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.
According to Beale, “At the end of this passage the Justice could not contain himself.
‘That’s the point,’ he kept whispering to us in the dark, ‘that’s it, that’s it!” A Man for
All Seasons, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
Although I claim no special expertise on the subject of Thomas More, my reading of
his Utopia (1516) suggests to me that his faith in humanity, in humanity’s capacity for
reason, was so great as to suggest he might not be among those who have thought
the “tissue of civility” to be thin. Frankfurter, as well as those who followed him, also
made a more specific point concerning the fragility of the courts’ authority. See Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Several years after Frankfurter’s death, and during the period of unrest associated
with the Vietnam War, Philip Kurland began his book on Frankfurter by lamenting
that “In these times of domestic and foreign turbulence, ‘law and order’ is a phrase
taken to mean police oppression and ‘reason’ is considered merely a device for the
protection of ‘the establishment’” and by quoting W.B. Yeats to the effect that
“[m]ere anarchy is loosed upon the world” and “the centre cannot hold.” PHILIP B.
KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1971). Kurland,
himself an important member of this community, ends the books with assertion that
the United States, in 1971, faced a crisis comparable to “the war against Hitler” and
that the authors of that crisis, by whom he presumably means the students in the
streets, have “glorified unreason,” id. at 223 (quoting C.P. Snow), and “brought our
entire civilization to imminent peril of destruction,” id. at 224-25 (quoting Learned
Hand’s assessment of the crisis represented by the war against Hitler). And he
quotes John Pym to the effect that:
The Law is that which puts a difference betwixt Good and Evil, betwixt Just
and Unjust; if you take away the Law, all things will fall into Confusion; every
Man will become a Law to himself, which in the depraved condition of
Human Nature, must needs produce great enormities; Lust will become a
Law, and Envy will become a Law, Covetnous and Ambition will become
Laws. . . . Today’s “Levellers,” [continues Kurland,] would not understand
this teaching . . . any more than they find Frankfurter’s teachings acceptable.
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reason, objectivity, deliberation, the possibility of consensus, and the
strong version of the rule of law.86 These—especially the rule of law—
are, in the view of this community, the qualities that separate
democracies from their totalitarian enemies and the faith by which
our civility will be assured.87 Under the historical circumstances,
these concerns and predispositions seem both reasonable and
warranted.
In their commitment to the strong version of the rule of law, the
legal process school envisions a society governed by laws not men, in
which judicial decisions do not depend on the personal or political
preferences of judges, and in which law is clearly separate from
politics.88 Insofar as this vision can be sustained, the ideal of the
Id. at 224; see also WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 11 (1955) (asserting
that “our great traditions of civility” are at risk; distrust of “the mob”); BICKEL, LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 27 (asserting the inherent instability of
democracy and the fragility of the rule of law).
86. Members of the legal process school are distinguished by their faith in the
possibilities of reason, neutrality, objectivity, and neutral principles, in the belief that
courts can act without reference to their personal or political preferences, and in the
belief that courts actually act in accordance with those ideals. Thus, Henry Hart
declares that “the tradition of Anglo-American law” is “thrilling” and that the
Supreme Court is “predestined . . . to be a voice of reason, charged with . . .
discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable
principles. . . .” Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 99 (1959). To similar effect, Alexander Bickel confidently asserts that “the
life of the law is reason,” that “reasoned deliberation” actually works, and that Hart is
right and the “nihilists” are wrong. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962),
supra note 73; PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1971).
87. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J.) (“Law alone saves a society from being rent by internecine strife or
ruled by mere brute power however disguised.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 393 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is absurd to see a
dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the
Mississippi Valley. The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It
does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.”);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 21 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) (“[L]awlessness if not
checked is the precursor to anarchy.”); see also HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 4
(tent. ed. 1958, 1994) (asserting that the alternative to respect for the rule of law is
“disintegrating resort to violence”); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 657-61, 672 (1958) (Nazi totalitarianism);
Philip Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629 (1970)
(likening the Warren Court to Orwellian fascism).
88. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) (asserting
that the Court must not “sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to
considerations of individual expediency”); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (asserting, in a school flagsalute case, that “as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor
agnostic. . . . As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or
how mischievous I may deem their disregard”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 255, 266-67 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.) (arguing that the Court’s judgment must be
based on “something much deeper and more justifiable than personal preference”
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separation of powers is vindicated and one can be a staunch
majoritarian,89 admit to the counter-majoritarian difficulty with
judicial review,90 and still defend the legitimacy of a restrained form
of judicial review.91 In addition, insofar as this vision of the rule of
law is actually achieved, we need not fear for the future of the Court’s
authority.
In seeking to realize the strong version of the rule of law, the legal
process school developed and promoted numerous strategies
intended to maximize the legitimacy of judicial decision-making.
Foremost among these is the idea of basing decisions upon “neutral
principles,”92 including those derived from the plain meaning of a
and in that sense, so far as possible, “impersonal”); BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962), supra note 73 (arguing that principled decision-making and
maturation of collective judgment actually happen on courts); see also supra note 78
(noting Justice Scalia’s expressed commitments to “plain meaning” and “a law of
rules,” and his distrust of judicial balancing and of reliance on legislative history).
89. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 27
(“democracies . . . live by the idea . . . that the majority has the ultimate power to
displace the decision-makers and to reject any part of their policy”); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Although Professor
Bickel was ultimately a majoritarian, he was a fearful majoritarian whose real faith
was in the governing elite. Thus, on the pages just cited, he states his assumption
“that the people themselves, by direct action at the ballot box, are surely incapable of
sustaining a working system of general values specifically applied” he describes direct
democracy as “the fallacy of the misplaced mystic, or the way of those who would use
the forms of democracy to undemocratic ends; and he explains that “[d]emocratic
government under law . . . carries the elements of explosion, [though] it doesn’t
contain a critical mass of them.” See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra
note 73, at 27.
Bickel’s regard for hierarchy may be expressed by his
pronouncement that “many a little man may rightly claim to be a better citizen than
the expert or the genius. See id. at 28; see also PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 224 (1971) (explaining Frankfurter’s
commitment to the idea of an “elite” and Kurland’s own disregard for the “Levellers”
of his day); WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955) (expressing distrust of
plebiscites and of the “mob”).
90. See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 649-52 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[E]ven the narrow judicial authority to nullify legislation has been
viewed with a jealous eye” because “it serves to prevent the full play of the democratic
process.”); BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 16-23.
91. Even Learned Hand, in The Bill of Rights (1958), approved a strictly limited
version of judicial review that bears a close relationship to the “clear mistake”
doctrine propounded by James Bradley Thayer in The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Frankfurter, Hart,
Wechsler, Bickel, and Wellington are, while strict, less so than Hand and Thayer. See
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73; PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971).
92. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 353 (1959); BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 49-65,
73-84; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971). A commitment to “principles” is one of the points of overlap between the
legal process school and what I shall describe as the legal positivist/analytic tradition.
See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 82 (1977) (arguing
that courts should rely on principles not policies); William N. Eskridge & Philip P.
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, THE
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text,93 from the “hard facts” of constitutional design and institutional
competence,94 from the presumed neutrality of procedural or
process-based solutions,95 or from the presence or absence of a shared
LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65, at cxvii (asserting that Dworkin “followed” and
“accepted” the position of Hart, Sacks, Wechsler, and Bickel on this matter).
Whatever the similarity, there are also important differences between Dworkin’s
handling of “principles” and the legal process school’s understanding of “neutral
principles.” At the very least, Dworkin shows no sign of embracing the legal process
school’s procedures for identifying the supposed “neutrality” of their principles.
93. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (Scalia, J.); Chisom v.
Edwards, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. District
Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (“When courts interpret a
statute, they search for its true meaning–-and there can never be more than one true
meaning.”) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 231. But see BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73
(criticizing the idea of plain meaning).
94. See generally HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65, at 10282. Clear examples include arguments by which the proper role of the judiciary are
derived from the courts’ place in our constitutional architecture and from the
relative competencies of various branches of government. See id. at 102-12; Henry M.
Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 84, 99 (1959) (explaining that the Supreme Court appears “predestined” by,
among other things, “the hard facts of its position in the structure of American
institutions, to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of discerning
afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles. . . .”);
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73 (deriving a theory of
constitutional adjudication from the tripartite structure of our government and from
the relative competencies of the three branches); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978) (originally written and
circulated within this community in 1957) (arguing that courts should avoid
“polycentric” tasks on grounds of competence).
Felix Frankfurter clearly anticipated these arguments in United States v. United Mine
Workers. See 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.) (asserting that judges are “set
apart” and well-positioned “to be depositories of law”); see also West Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 651-52 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If the function
of this Court is to be essentially no different from that of a legislature, if the
considerations governing constitutional construction are to be substantially those
that underlie legislation, then . . . judges should not have life tenure and they should
be made directly responsible to the electorate.”); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428
(1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (arguing from “[t]he limitations of litigation—its episodic
character, its necessarily restricted scope of inquiry, its confined regard for
considerations of policy, its dependence on the contingencies of a particular record,
and other circumscribing factors” to argue against the Court’s assuming jurisdiction
in an interpleader action involving a controversy among four states).
Similar arguments have been made within the domain of administrative law where,
for instance, Frankfurter and Landis supported the role of administrative agencies
through arguments from institutional competence. See Felix Frankfurter, The Task of
Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614 (1927); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative
Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1964).
95. Members of this community exhibit a strong interest in the correct design of
institutions as inherently good, as important to the smooth working of government,
as a factor contributing to the legitimacy and stability of the law in general and of our
various particular institutions, and as a corollary to the principle of institutional
settlement. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65, at 6
(asserting that the “second corollary” to the “principle of institutional settlement” is
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social consensus.96 These strategies also include reliance upon the
“passive virtues” by which courts might avoid the resolution of issues
on which reason and deliberation have not yet produced the
necessary consensus.97 Courts ought not impose substantive solutions
the duty to attend “to the constant improvement of all of [our] procedures”);
William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to the
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65, at xciv-xcvi.
Many of them seem also to have shared Professor Hart’s view that “the first recourse
of law, in dealing with intractable questions, is to seek not final answers but an
agreeable procedure for getting acceptable answers” at least in part because
“[p]eople are bound to disagree . . . about the substance of the answers.” Henry M.
Hart, “Note on Some Essentials of a Working Theory of Law” (ca 1950), Hart Papers,
Box 17, Folder 1 (on file with the Harvard University Law Library).
The strong connection between the legal process school and administrative law
surely reflects these commitments. See, e.g., supra note 82. So does their attention to
issues regarding the separation of powers and to procedural due process, both of
which offer procedural answers to substantive questions. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(separation of powers); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 363 (1963)
(imposing a procedural solution upon a substantive antitrust question).
96. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 18; Harry
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court must do all it can not to become “entangled in political controversies,
especially those that touch the passions of the day”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 255, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that Court’s
judgment “must rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which
widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse
nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction. . . . [Accordingly, the Court must not] inject itself into the clash of political
forces.” ). But see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 63-69 (1980) (discussing
the view that “constitutional law must now be understood as expressly contemporary
norms”).
97. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 111-98 (urging
the Court to avoid the merits of constitutional cases, through such devices as the
denial of certiorari or the dismissal of appeals, or through doctrines of standing,
ripeness, mootness, desuetude, political questions, when no usable principle is then
at hand); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Forward: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1961) (discussing the means by which the Court has
limited its judicial review). The Courts’ avoidance of the resolution of issues would
permit a new issue to “simmer” through the accumulation of incidents and the
maturation of opinion. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73,
at 176. Or it would permit solution by non-judicial processes. See id. at 177.
Alternatively, abstention would promote the development of usable principles
through a “colloquy with the political institutions.” See id. at 179. Lastly, judicial
review can “sap the quality of the political process.” See id. at 155. But see Gerald
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues:” A Comment on Principles and Expediency
of Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1, (1964) (criticizing Bickel’s strategy of
abstention by courts as unprincipled).
Professor Bickel’s argument concerning the passive virtues is a fairly straightforward extension of two arguments that Justice Frankfurter had long been making
concerning the numerous rules by which, in his view, the Court ought to avoid
constitutional questions whenever possible and concerning the prudential
importance of the Court’s steering clear of the political thicket. See United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that because
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for which there is no general social consensus, both because such
impositions are illegitimate and because they may undermine
people’s faith in the courts and in the rule of law. The legal process
school’s commitment to neutral principles strongly predisposes it to
applications of the “gored ox test” to hypothetical extensions of an
argumentative position.98 Members of this community will criticize
“the most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face
constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all possible,” the Court has
“developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a
series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision”) (quoting Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
501-09 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.) (noting that the Court has developed its own series of
rules where it avoids passing judgment on significant constitutional questions); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court must
avoid political questions).
98. “[A] neutral principle is a rule of action that will be authoritatively enforced
without adjustment or concession and without let-up. If it sometimes hurts, nothing is
better proof of its validity.” BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at
59 (emphasis added). As I have studied this form of argument in countless lunchtable arguments between legal process advocates (“LP”) and their skeptical
adversaries (“SA”), I have found that it takes two forms, one defensive and the other
offensive. In its defensive form, LP offers an argument that is nominally based on a
principle but that could, in theory, reflect nothing more than his own personal
preferences. He then seeks to demonstrate that his argument is based on principle
(and is therefore powerful) and not on personal preference (and therefore weak) by
asserting that there exists some possible state of affairs in which his own personal
preferences would be disserved by the principle in question and by asserting that
under those (absent) conditions he would willingly accept that disservice to his
preferences. Therefore, at least to his satisfaction, he has shown that his argument is
founded not on personal preference but instead on neutral principles. Accordingly,
he should win.
The offensive use of the “gored ox test” involves LP’s application of this test to his
adversary SA’s arguments. Here, LP hypothesizes some situation in which the
principle SA has asserted would be strongly inconsistent with what LP knows to be
SA’s personal or political preferences; by eliciting SA’s admission that he might not
be inclined to apply that principle in that hypothetical case; and then making some
gesture by which victory is claimed. It usually involves a kind of turning-of-the-tables
on free speech, hate speech, the politics of racial identity, Nazis in Skokie, etc. LP
takes the claim of victory to be warranted because, at least to his own satisfaction, he
has either exposed SA’s position as hypocritical (in which event SA’s argument would
carry no weight) or he has shown that SA’s argument is not one of principle (which
would be powerful) but one of personal preference (which would not). If this is a
form of argument, it is also closely related to a form of classroom colloquy that many
of my colleagues would unselfconsciously assume is simply how one teaches law. It is
also, I think, a staple of oral argument before the Supreme Court.
Many who are not members of the legal process community find this form of
argument far less compelling than do those who are, and proponents of
contemporary critical theory are likely to be totally unpersuaded. From their
perspective, all legal principles are ineradicably unstable, and none can be neutral.
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976) (criticizing the notion that rules and standards can be
applied in isolation from the substantive issue to which they purport to respond);
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209
(1979) (discussing altruism versus individualism); Gerald Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1984) (discussing why
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judicial activism;99 judicial discretion, unconfined judicial balancing,
and slippery slopes;100 unreasoned per curium decisions;101 and all
other such “unprincipled” resolutions. Also among their rhetorical
attempts by bureaucratic theorists to defend corporations and administrative law fail
to overcome problems of managerial domination and personal alienation that exists
in every hierarchical organization); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV.
465, 477-82 (1988) (discussing the private/public distinction and the consent versus
coercion debate). Accordingly, “we act and act and act on one direction, but then
reach the sticking point. . . . We make commitments, and pursue them. The
moment of abandonment is no more rational than that of the beginning, and
equally a moment of terror.” Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1775 (1976).
99. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959) (criticizing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), Shelly v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 294 (1955), as unprincipled);
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 51-59 (criticizing Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), as unprincipled); Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court,
1963 Term—Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 162-67 (1964); Philip Kurland, Earl
Warren, the “Warren Court,” and the Warren Court Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968);
Philip Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19 (1969);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Philip
Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 682 (1970)
(likening the Warren Court to Orwellian fascism); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (criticizing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), as unprincipled); see also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 260
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court must not “[stray] off the
clear path of its jurisdiction to reach a desired result”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Rigorous
adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial function is especially demanded in
controversies that arouse appeals to the Constitution.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—possessed of
neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in
its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete
detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by
abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements . . . .”).
100. The touchstone on this subject is Justice Frankfurter’s declaration, in
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), that the Court must not “sit like a kadi under
a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.” See
id. at 11; see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 266-67 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J.) (asserting that courts must make “impersonal judgments . . .
founded on something much deeper and more justifiable than personal
preferences”); BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 55 and
passim (arguing that “the inviting garden of . . . ‘judicial impressionism’ is forbidden
territory” and, more generally, adjudication based on neutral principles is clearly
understood to be good precisely in virtue of its elimination of judicial discretion);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989)
(discussing the distinction between rules and personal discretion in a judicial
system); cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 626
(1990) (Scalia, J.) (condemning the proposal to assess transient jurisdiction question
under a “totality of the circumstances” test on grounds that such an approach “does
not establish a rule of law at all”).
101. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term—Forward, 65 HARV. L. REV.
107, 108-09, 112-13 (1951); Albert M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term—Forward,
68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 103 (1954); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3,
5-6, 35 (1957); BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73.
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tools is what might seem the unlikely conjunction of a commitment
to the practice of “purposive interpretation”102 and a steadfast
opposition to arguments based upon the “motives,” perhaps
especially the bad motives, of a legislature.103 Finally in this vein, they
generally embrace “the principle of institutional settlement,” which is
a kind of moral obligation to respect the law and to work within the
system.104
This group is marked by its passionate commitment to the strong
version of the rule of law; its faith in the possibilities of reason,
neutrality, and objectivity;105 and its almost unshakeable confidence
102. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 61-63; HART &
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65, at 102-07; see also Lon L. Fuller, The
Case of Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 616, 624 (1949) (“Foster, J.”
arguing for a legal treatment of self-defense “cannot be reconciled with the words of
the statute, but only with its purpose”).
103. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 208-10; Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Hart and Sacks write that:
The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of
regularized and peaceable methods of decision.
The principle of
institutional settlement expresses the judgement that decisions which are the
duly arrived at as a result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to
be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly
changed. . . . [E]ach system whatever it may be, provides the indispensable
framework for living within the society in question. Short of a violent
reconstitution of the system, it provides the means, and the only means, by
which the problems of that society can be resolved.
HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65, at 5. I trust my reader
to imagine how this message was received, in the late 1960s, by students who
were then engaged in direct action on matters related to civil rights and the
Vietnam War. As one of those students, I recognize this as the voice of our
disapproving seniors, although at least in my case it had its counterpart in the
internalized voice urging me, supposedly on tactical grounds, to “work within the
system.” See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24, 26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that one may criticize and seek to change the law, but until
it is changed one must obey).
105. Henry M. Hart provides a classical statement of this faith when he announces
that the Supreme Court “is predestined . . . not only by the thrilling tradition of
Anglo-American law but also by the hard fact of its position in the structure of
American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of
discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable
principles of constitutional law . . . .” Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 89 (1959); see also Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1959)
(offering an argument that rests on faith in the possibility of neutral principles);
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 27, 82-84 (quoting,
celebrating, and defending Hart’s statement about the “thrilling tradition,” that
reason works, and that “the life of the law is reason”).
Justice Frankfurter’s faith in reason and confidence that, within the judiciary,
reason really works, is easily illustrated. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 603 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) where Frankfurter writes:
[T]he judgments of this Court are collective judgments. Such judgments
presuppose ample time and freshness of mind for private study and
reflection in preparation for discussions in Conference. Without adequate
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that through correct institutional design and the process of collective
deliberation, sometimes led by the Supreme Court,106 we can find and
agree upon the right answers to even the hardest questions of public
policy and law,107 even on such difficult matters as race. This group is
also distinguished by its concern for the fragility of democratic
institutions and for the authority of the Court; its commitment to
civility; and its opposition to the skepticism—they would call it
“nihilism”—of the legal realists. Such skepticism is, to them,
empirically unwarranted. Further, such talk is both dangerous and
destructive insofar as it may undermine the public’s faith in reason
and the rule of law and, if judges take it to heart, be an evil and
self-fulfilling prophecy.108
study there cannot be adequate reflection; without adequate reflection there
cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate discussion there cannot be
that mature and fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to wise
decisions and luminous opinions.
Id. at 603; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Law alone saves a society from being rent by
internecine strive or ruled by mere brute power however disguised” and judges, “set
apart . . . by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the
usual temptations of private interest may reasonably be expected to be ‘as free,
impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit’”); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A
constitutional democracy like ours . . . is more dependent than any other form of
government on knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for the achievement of its
aims. For our democracy implies the reign of reason on the most extensive scale.”);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 21 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) (“[L]awlessness if not
checked is the precursor to anarchy.”).
106. Professor Bickel’s entire project concerning “the passive virtues” rests on the
assumption that the Court, if it does its job right, can move the nation in the
direction of a national consensus on difficult issues. See Alexander Bickel, The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961);
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 23-28. This is, for
instance, clearly what he sees as having happened on the question of racial
segregation, and it is, in his view, what could have happened but did not with respect
to the death penalty. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review,
66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (asserting that Justices are teachers in a “vital
national seminar”); Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959) (discussing the process by which the
Court decides cases, and discussing the relationship between this process and the
substantive outcome of cases).
107. See Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959) (asserting the maturing of collective thought);
Erwin Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959—Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes—Professor
Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 85, 94 (1960); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); BICKEL, LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 23-29, 80-84, 111-98, 200-08, 235-43,
244-54 (asserting that “the maturing of collective thought” actually happens and that
“reason” works and explaining the role of the Court and of principled decisionmaking in leading opinion toward eventual consensus); see also WALTER LIPPMAN, THE
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 40 (1955) (asserting that “the public interest may be presumed to
be what man would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted
disinterestedly and benevolently.”).
108. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 108.
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While most of these men view themselves as political liberals, their
time, place, and emotional and intellectual commitments all cast
them as the defenders of existing institutions during the disturbances
of the 1960s. At the time of the violence at Kent State, they stood on
the inside of the barricades—and it is my experience that one cannot
overstate the importance of this passionate standoff in the lives of
these people. Across those barricades were the forces of darkness:
those who spoke against the possibility of neutrality, objectivity,
reason, and the rule of law; those who spoke against the settled
expertise of the Cold War generation and who shouted down
speakers; those who broke the laws, sometimes committed violence,
and paid no heed to the principle of institutional settlement; those
who rejected the claim that the existing order was fair and legitimate;
and those who violated the fundamental rules of civility.109 The
dis-ease of the legal process school, both with these events and with
certain of the skepticisms associated with legal realism, reflect, at least
in part, their deeply felt belief that their adversaries were
undermining the people’s faith in reason and the rule of law, which
faith was essential to the preservation of our fragile institutions; that
those adversaries promoted cynicism; and that to promote cynicism
was to put democracy at risk.110 If, as these “nihilists” saw it, reason
were inherently infused with politics and power, then the strong
version of the rule of law must fail, and the separation of law from
politics is impossible. To the members of this community, such a
result would be wholly intolerable.
E. Law and Economics
“Law and economics” is among the most important contemporary
American perspectives on the law. Whole bodies of law are now
exclusively within its domain, including antitrust,111 economic
109. See, e.g., discussion supra note 85 (concerning Kurland’s discussion of these
matters in PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1971).
110. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, 81-84 (attacking
“neo-realists” and “nihilists,” in the person of Thurman Arnold, for their “cynicism”
and for “propagating a self-validating picture of reality”); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law
and the River, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 222 (1984) (“A lawyer who succumbs to legal nihilism
faces a far greater danger than mere professional incompetence. He must
contemplate the dreadful reality of government by cunning and a society in which
only right is might. Such a fright can sustain belief in many that law is at least
possible and must matter.”); Owen Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1986).
111. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(1976); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
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regulation,112 and major portions of corporate law.113 In a great many
other areas of the law, including property,114 contract,115 torts,116 and
environmental law,117 law and economics is a serious and important
(1978); HERBERT H. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (1994).
112. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS (1970); A.K. Klevorick, The “Optimal” Fair Rate of Return, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 122 (1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
(1982).
113. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION
LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); David D. Haddock,
Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to
Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent
Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991).
114. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960);
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
347 (1967); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW
(Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975); Louis De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A
Review of the Evidence, 2 J. RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1980); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
115. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
427 (1983); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989). See generally THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (Anthony T. Kronman &
Richard A. Posner eds., 1979).
116. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 14-15 (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW (1987); Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).
117. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(discussing social costs of firms’ actions that harm the environment); Harold
Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1964)
(discussing costs imposed on traders and owners by exchange of goods and
maintenance of control over use of goods); ORRIS C. HERFINDAHL & ALLEN V. KNEESE,
QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SOME PROBLEMS IN USING
LAND, WATER AND AIR (1965) (applying economic reasoning to problem of natural
resource deterioration); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968) (discussing inherent problems of policy of laissez-faire in reproduction);
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1-6
(1974) (discussing contributions of nature, science, economics, politics, law and
philosophy to formulation of public policy); ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
SELECTED READINGS (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 2d ed. 1977)
(providing a collection of essays addressing economic concerns that measures taken
to protect environment are efficient); TOM TEITENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1988); A. MYRICK FREEMAN, III, THE
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contender for dominance. It has even laid an intelligible, if not
necessarily persuasive, claim to providing a general theory, perhaps
the general theory, of law.118
Practitioners of law and economics include Robert Bork,119 Richard
Posner,120 Frank Easterbrook121 and Guido Calabresi,122 all of whom
had distinguished academic careers before being appointed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals, as well as countless others.123 The work that
MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS
(1993) (providing overview of principle methods of resource valuation).
118. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) (published
in five editions beginning in 1972) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed.
1998)].
119. Bork’s writings on law and economics include, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Vertical
Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division: Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Robert H. Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division: Part II, 75 YALE
L.J. 775 (1965); Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77
YALE L.J. 950 (1968); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF (1978).
120. Posner’s contributions to law and economics, see for example RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Richard A.
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); RICHARD
A. POSNER & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979);
RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND
SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
(1981); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193 (1985); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990);
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed.
1998), supra note 118.
121. Easterbrook’s writings include, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in
Antitrust?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 705 (1982); Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Frank Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1696 (1986); FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
122. Calabresi’s writings on law and economics include GUIDO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Guido Calabresi,
Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
123. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960);
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS; A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUPREME CT. REV. 41;
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975); GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM (1982); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1983); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1988); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (1994); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998),
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this group has done in developing and extending this paradigm has
been some of the most original, provocative, and successful work
done anywhere within the law during the last two generations.
Though this movement can trace its origins to Becccaria124 and
Bentham,125 it is a lineal descendant of legal realism126 and is, as a
practical matter, a twentieth-century American invention.
It is customary to divide this theoretical perspective into two rival
factions. One is the “Chicago school of law and economics.”127 It
arose out of the seminars that the economist Aaron Director taught
at the University of Chicago law school; it is affiliated with, but not
identical to, Milton Friedman’s “Chicago school of economics”; its
proponents include Judges Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook; and it is
conservative in its politics and, some would say, reductionist in its
economics. The other camp, I will call them the “Not-Chicago school
of law and economics,” includes, among others, Judge Calabresi,
Oliver Williamson,128 Herbert Hovenkamp,129 Eleanor Fox,130 and
Susan Rose-Ackerman.131 The Not-Chicago school tends to be more
supra note 118.
124. See CESARE BONESANA BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764)
(discussing crime and punishment in terms of their social utility).
125. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970)
(1789) (applying principles of utility to the legal system).
126. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 44-46 (1995).
127. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1979) (explaining the foundations of the Chicago School of antitrust);
Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983) (recounting the intellectual history of the
Chicago School of law and economics). See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Chicago School
of Law and Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Peter
Newman ed., 1987).
128. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
(1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: FIRMS, MARKETS AND
POLICY CONTROL (1986); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics Meets
Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 99 (1993).
129. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN.
L. REV. 645 (1983); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
(1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN.
L. REV. (1988); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law
and Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990); HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (1994).
130. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714
(1986); Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making:
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (1986); Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the
Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917 (1987).
131. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics—
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progressive in its politics and less reductionist in its economics than
its Chicago school counterparts. Apart from this division between the
Chicago and the Not-Chicago schools, analysts have also divided the
domain of law and economics between the “normative” and the
“positive” (or descriptive) use of economics,132 and between the
“politically conservative” and the “politically liberal” use of economic
analysis.133
For my money (as some might say), it is far more useful to
distinguish between a “strong” and a “weak” version of law and
economics. According to the strong version, justice is, and only is,
the maximization of aggregate wealth and the promotion of
allocative efficiency.134 This is a form of utilitarianism marked by its
commitment not to the maximization of aggregate utility or happiness
but to the maximization of aggregate wealth.135 Aggregate wealth and

and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at “Regulatory Reform” in the Eighties, 61 U. COLO. L.
REV. 517 (1990).
132. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 26-29.
133. See id.; Alex M. Johnson, An Appeal for the “Liberal” Use of Law and Economics, 67
TEX. L. REV. 659 (1989) (stating that law and economics is apolitical, equally useful
to liberals as to conservatives); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra
note 118, at 29-30 (rejecting the claim that law and economics “manifests a
conservative political bias”).
134. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) (elaborating the theory that
justice, at least in antitrust law, is wealth maximization); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) (elaborating the theory that justice is wealth
maximization); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, passim
(elaborating the theory that justice is the maximization of wealth); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645, 647 n.17, 670
(1983) (arguing that the common law is best understood as having pursued the
maximization of aggregate wealth).
135. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978) (defending efficiency on the grounds that it provides the greatest good for
the greatest number); see also Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (acknowledging “philosophical hostility to
utilitarianism” and claims to have solved its problems through shift from
maximization of utility to maximization of wealth).
In response to utilitarianism’s unpopularity, Posner has progressively distanced
himself from Bentham’s movement. His progress can be marked from (1)
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357 (1st ed. 1972) in which “utilitarianism . . . is another
name for economic theory,” to (2) ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20 (2d ed. 1977) in
which “utilitarianism” is “the philosophical basis of economics” but is different
enough that wealth-maximization is “quite untouched by any debate over the
philosophical merits of utilitarianism,” to (3) ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed.
1986) in which all references to the possibility that his “law and economics”
approach may be the same as or based upon utilitarianism have disappeared and
utilitarianism has simply become one of those systems of belief that economic
analysis is different from and better than. Such reasons as Judge Posner has offered
for this dissociation boil down to the claim that Kaldor-Hicks wealth maximization
can be trusted, in ways that utilitarianism cannot, to generate answers to our
problems and never to provide comfort to those who may want to redistribute wealth.
See id.
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allocative efficiency are, in turn, understood to be those things that
are naturally maximized by a freely operating perfect market.136
Then, if this is the meaning of justice, the purposes of law are: (1) to
maximize the market’s domain;137 (2) to facilitate the market’s
operation through, for instance, the minimization of transaction
costs;138 (3) to correct the market’s imperfections, whether they
involve externalities, public goods, free riders, or certain forms of
rent-seeking;139 and (4) where for instance there can be no market, as
in the case of accidents, to do what the market would have done.140
Beyond these four purposes, there is an affirmative, efficiency-based
136. This proposition is given the status of an economic fact. See POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 11-12; ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 6, 585-88 (2d ed. 1992). Once this is taken
to be the case, aggregate wealth is neither the total sum of a society’s money, as
explained in Posner’s Economic Analysis, see supra note 118, nor the sum of the market
value of all its assets. At this stage, I know of no better definition of aggregate wealth
than this: that sum of those values that is maximized by a freely operating perfect
market. As a technical matter, this definition is not circular. But it does suggest that,
once we embraced as our objective the maximization of aggregate wealth, neither
our preference for freely operating perfect market nor our distrust of state
interference in the market require any further explanation.
137. Posner urges us to maximize the market’s domain when he argues that
(1) everything, or at least everything of value, should be held as private property or,
at the very least, managed as if it were private property; (2) everything should be
transferable in voluntary and priced transactions; and (3) there should be strong
incentives through the law of crimes and intentional torts to deter behavior that
unnecessarily evades the market in favor of coerced transactions. See POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 36, 43-54, 61-72, 126, 224-29,
237-42.
138. See id. at 101-08 (contract law); id. at 122-26 (minimization of transaction
costs and optimization of administrative costs through prohibition of fraud).
139. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing and
criticizing rationales for regulation); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998),
supra note 118, at 166 (arguing that the regulation of divorce is warranted because
parents will not otherwise “fully internalize the cost to the . . . third party . . .
children”); id. at 180 (asserting that tort law may be justified by reference to
externalities); id. at 301-05 (monopoly as a market imperfection); id. at 377-81
(public utility regulation justified by natural monopoly condition); id. at 508-11
(using state action to alleviate poverty is warranted only because “affluent altruists”
who are willing and able to do something about it face “a free-rider problem”); id. at
523 (taxes warranted because of free rider problems associated with public goods).
See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
(1975); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971).
140. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase
argues that, at least where transaction costs are very low, the market will efficiently
allocate rights and entitlements, and the law need not be concerned with their
allocation. Thus, Posner explains that where “the cost of voluntary transactions is
low, common law doctrines create incentives for people to channel their transactions
through the market.” POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at
277. It is only when “the cost of allocating resources by voluntary transactions is
prohibitively high, making the market an infeasible method of allocating resources,”
that the common law must step in and “price[] behavior in such a way as to mimic
the market.” Id. Among the circumstances in which transaction costs are high, at
least for Posner, are those he describes as “bilateral monopolies.” See id. at 274.
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case against state action or legal intervention. Indeed, according to
the Coase Theorem, except where transaction costs are relatively
high, the law need not and ought not be concerned with the setting
of rights and entitlements.141 Then when those costs are high, the law
ought to allocate rights and entitlements so as to maximize aggregate
wealth, which is, of course, what the market itself would have done in
the absence of those transaction costs. Further in the same vein,
proponents of the strong version of law and economics believe that
the law need not be concerned with the mere transfer of wealth,
except when such transfers have an adverse effect on allocative
efficiency and aggregate wealth.142 Thus monopoly is a problem not
because the taking—or, more neutrally, the transfer—of monopoly
profits may be wrong in the way that theft is wrong, but because the
monopolist will raise prices and restrict output. Insofar as these price
and output levels differ from what would have been set by a freely
operating perfect market, “too little” of the monopolist’s product is
produced, resources are in that way “misallocated,” and aggregate
wealth is reduced.143
141. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
142. Under Judge Posner’s view, efficiency is a matter of aggregate wealth, and
simple transfers of wealth from one person to another have no effect on aggregate
wealth. Such a transfer “would not diminish the stock of resources. It would
diminish my purchasing power, but it would increase the recipient’s by the same
amount. Put differently, it would be a private cost but not a social one. A social cost
diminishes the wealth of society; a private cost merely rearranges that wealth.”
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 7. Because involuntary
wealth transfers from one person to another do not, in and of themselves, diminish
aggregate wealth, they are, without more, a matter to which the law ought be
indifferent.
Efforts to secure involuntary wealth transfers are not subject to condemnation
because they transfer wealth from the perpetrator to the victim. Rather, they are
subject to condemnation when and only when they give rise to social costs. See id. at
126 (arguing that extortion is a bad idea not because one person is enriched at
another’s expense but because it “channel[s] resources into the making of threats
and into efforts to protect against them”); id. at 226 (arguing that theft is bad not
because of the injury inflicted on the victim but because of social costs entailed when
owners are induced to “spend heavily on protection” and thieves, “on thwarting the
owners’ protective efforts”); id. at 237-42 (same regarding crime generally); id. at
301-05 (arguing that monopoly is bad not because one person is enriched at
another’s expense but because of “social costs” including “deadweight loss” and
socially wasteful efforts to secure monopoly power); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 110-12 (1978) (expressing and
defending indifference to injuries to consumers arising from the transfer of
monopoly profits and to the harm that one competitor might inflict upon another).
143. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 10001 (1978) (explaining that the monopolist will charge a higher price and produce
“fewer widgets” than would have been produced if the industry were competitive).
This “restriction of output . . . creates a misallocation of resources and thereby makes
society poorer. The evil of monopoly . . . is not higher prices or smaller production
(though these are its concomitants) but misallocated resources, or allocation
inefficiency.” Id. Bork also acknowledges that “[t]hose who continue to buy after a
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The strong version of law and economics is a theory of justice and
law in which rights exist, and ought to exist, only insofar as they
contribute to the maximization of aggregate wealth, and in which a
person’s value and moral worth exist in and only in the degree to
which that person is willing and able to pay.144 Accordingly, it is a
theory of justice and law that embodies, reflects, and reproduces the
existing distribution of wealth. Proponents of the strong version may
also believe that economics explains everything145 and that, because
allocative efficiency is our objective and markets are self-correcting,
private economic power is not nearly so serious a problem as is
government interference in the market.146 They are likely to believe
that state action must either promote allocative efficiency or
monopoly is formed pay more for the same output, and that shifts income from
them to the monopoly and its owners . . . .” Id. But he is absolutely clear that such
“income distribution effects of economic activity should be completely excluded
from the determination of the antitrust legality of the activity” because “the shift in
income distribution does not lessen total wealth.” See id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-11 (arguing that the taking of
monopoly profits is itself objectionable and in so doing, they take a position more
consonant with the weak version of law and economics than with the strong); Robert
H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72-74 (1982); Gerald B. Wetlaufer,
Reconstructing the Sherman Act: Law, Economics, and the Ethic of Industry and Restraint
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
144. Judge Posner formally defines “value” as “human satisfaction as measured by
aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services” which is “a function
. . . the distribution of income wealth.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977). Moreover, in a system in which justice is the maximization of
aggregate wealth, and aggregate wealth is understood to be that which is maximized
through voluntary market transactions, a person’s worth is measured by their ability
to pay. It is in this sense that scarce medical resources ought to be allocated to the
rich person who wants cosmetic surgery but not to the poor child at the point of
death “because value is measured by willingness to pay . . . .” See id. It is in this sense
that the problem with poverty is not the suffering of poor people, who are
presumably neither willing nor able to pay to do something about it. Rather, “the
major cost of poverty is the dis-utility it imposes on affluent altruists.” Id. at 464; see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 67-68 (1981).
145. The economic model:
is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it
behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow prices, repeated or
infrequent decisions, large or minor decision, emotional or mechanical
ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, brilliant or
stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians, teachers or
students.
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 8 (1976). See also
Gary S. Becker, Elizabeth M. Landes & Robert T. Michael, An Economic Analysis of
Marital Stability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141 (1977); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed.
1998), supra 118, at 155-56 (explaining the institution of the family in terms of
“economies of scale” and its facilitation of “the division of labor, yielding gains from
specialization”); id. at 158 (“The pleasure we get from our children’s presence is the
result of ‘consuming’ the intangible ‘services’ that they render us.”).
146. See Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164-65 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
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redistribute wealth,147 and that all such redistribution is presumed to
diminish aggregate wealth,148 to result from the self-interested (rentseeking) behavior of those who are its beneficiaries,149 and to be
illegitimate150 and either ineffective or counterproductive.151 And they
may well hold the views that a society’s practices and institutions will
persist only insofar as they are efficient152 and that the common law,
properly understood, has always been about the maximization of
aggregate wealth.153
For its part, the weak version of law and economics is distinct from
the strong primarily in its rejection of the notion that justice is, and
only is, the maximization of aggregate wealth. With it, the weak
version rejects the idea that value and moral worth are, and only are,
a matter of peoples’ ability and willingness to pay. It also rejects the
147. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 175, 572-78;
ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); ROBERT S.
PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 6, 585-88 (2d ed. 1992); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 119-30 (2d ed.
1989).
148. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 7, 302-03
(asserting that the argument is not that redistribution, as such, causes a diminution
in aggregate wealth, but rather, it is understood, standing alone, to have no such
effect); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 110-12 (1978) (expressing indifference to transfer of monopoly profits); id. at
72-89 (expressing indifference to harm that one competitor might do another);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 48 (1985) (explaining
that economic measures of efficiency are “indifferent to how resources are
distributed in society”).
Instead, the argument is that redistribution causes a diminution in aggregate
wealth by virtue of its administrative costs, incentive and substitution effects, and
rent-seeking. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 22024 (no-fault accident compensation); id. at 500-04 (redistribution is costly); id. at 51114 (in-kind benefits including legal services for the poor); id. at 514-18 (housing
codes); id. at 525-29 (excise taxes); id. at 544-48 (progressive taxation).
149. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 175 (laws
against bigamy); id. at 572-75 (legislation generally); see also DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 229-44 (1989); R.D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS
575-602 (1982); TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J.M. Buchanan et
al. eds., 1990).
150. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1992), supra note 118, at 503
(“Involuntary [state-sponsored] redistribution is a coerced transfer not justified by
high market-transaction costs; it is, in efficiency terms, a form of theft.”)
151. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 361-63
(arguing that minimum wage laws are counterproductive); id. at 514-18 (same
regarding housing codes); see also Edgar O. Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent
Control, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1081 (1972) (same regarding rent control); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 180-81 (1962) (same regarding minimum wage
laws); see also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY,
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991).
152. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118, at 155 (“The
persistence of the family as a social institution suggests . . . that the institution must
have important economizing properties.”).
153. See id. at 29-268 and especially at 251-68; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics
of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645, 647-70 (1983).
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ideas that the only legitimate purpose of law and other forms of state
action is expanding, facilitating, fixing, and mimicking the market;
that state action is inherently a problem; that institutions persist only
if they are efficient; and that the purpose of the common law is, and
always has been, the maximization of aggregate wealth. Proponents
of the weak version are likely to believe that people have rights over
and above those that may be warranted by efficiency.154 They are also
likely to believe that the law may properly serve social needs or
interests other than efficiency and the vindication of rights,155 or that
it may properly prohibit bad conduct.156 Finally, despite their
reservations about certain “applications” of economics to law,
proponents of the weak version will find numerous ways in which
economic analysis may be useful in understanding or applying the
law.157 While these applications would not distinguish for us between
what is right and what is wrong, they might tell us whether or not
there exists some legally significant economic predicate (e.g.,
monopoly power or lessening of competition); help us to identify the
most cost-effective way of accomplishing some goal, whether it be
minimizing criminal behavior, regulating natural monopolies, or
protecting the environment; or permit us to assess the economic
consequences, including for instance the economic injury, arising
from some conduct or act.
F.

The Legal Positivist/Analytic Tradition

The legal positivist/analytic tradition is less a single school of
thought than a continuous intellectual tradition that probably begins
with Thomas Hobbes158 and that includes Jeremy Bentham,159 John
154. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645,
691-97 (1983); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1097-98 (1972).
155. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1097-98 (1972); Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
156. See Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979) (asserting that congressional history demonstrates that
Congress did not intend for economic gains to be the sole factor in resolving
antitrust controversies); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982)
(arguing that Congress passed antitrust laws to further distributive rather than
efficient economic objectives by preventing unfair transfers of wealth from
consumers to firms with market power); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Reconstructing the
Sherman Act: Law, Economics and the Ethic of Industry and Restraint (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
157. See TOM TEITENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS
(1984).
158. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
159. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT:
THE LIMITS OF

44

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1

Austin,160 H.L.A. Hart,161 Ronald Dworkin,162 Joseph Raz,163 Ernest
Weinrib,164 Jeremy Waldron,165 and others.166 The tradition is largely
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
160. Austin’s work includes, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr. ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (1832);
JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW
(1863). For a number of other workers about Austin, see W.L. MORISON, JOHN
AUSTIN (1982); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, THE THOUGHT OF JOHN AUSTIN (1985).
161. Hart’s publications include, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Philosophy of Law and
Jurisprudence in Britain (1942-52), 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 355-64 (1953); H.L.A. Hart,
Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37-60 (1954); H.L.A. Hart,
Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U.
PA. L. REV. 953 (1957); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (A.I. Melden ed., 1958); H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW (1959); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968); H.L.A. Hart, American
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV.
969 (1977); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY (1983). For more
information on Hart, see NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
162. Dworkin’s writings include, e.g., RONALD A. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); Ronald A. Dworkin, ‘Natural’ Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV.
165-88 (1982); RONALD A. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD A.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD A. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); RONALD
A. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(1996).
163. Raz’s publications include, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
(1970); LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART (P.M.S.
Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1978);
Joseph Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 123
(1984); Joseph Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM (1986).
164. Weinrib’s writings include, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of
Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding
Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 486 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Aristotle’s Forms of Justice, 2
RATIO JURIS 211 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403
(1992).
165. Waldron’s major publications include, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THEORIES OF
RIGHTS (1984); JEREMY WALDRON, NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE, AND
MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1987); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1988); JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS (1993); Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s
Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF
LEGISLATION (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
166. See, e.g., ALBERT KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS (1927); A.L. Goodhart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); GLANVILLE L.
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (1953); Robert S. Summers, The New
Analytic Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861 (1966) [hereinafter Summers, New Analytic
Jurists (1966)]; ROLF SARTORIOUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS (1975);
NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984 et seq.); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV.
283 (1989); STEPHEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992); R. KENT
GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (1997). For secondary treatments, see Joel Feinberg,
Analytic Jurisprudence, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1967); and Albert
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British, or at least Anglocentric. As such, it is distinguished by its
associations with the universities at Oxford and Cambridge, and with
the last three centuries of British political theory167—including its
commitments to positivism,168 utilitarianism,169 and classical
liberalism.170 It is similarly distinguished by its strong connections
with twentieth-century British philosophy, a discipline that includes
the analytic philosophy of Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gilbert Ryle,
and J.L. Austin and that, in Britain, has often been taken to be both
the “master discipline” and the crown jewel of the academy.171
Finally, it is marked as an essentially British intellectual tradition by
its resistance to the claims of legal realism172 and its open hostility to
Kocourek, The Century of Analytic Jurisprudence Since John Austin, in LAW, A CENTURY OF
PROGRESS (A. Reppy ed., 1937).
167. If we accept the main line of British political theory to include, among many
others, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill,
and John Rawls, we then have a tradition that is inseparable from the
positivist/analytic tradition in law. Hobbes and Bentham were themselves the most
prominent early legal positivists. John Austin’s primary intellectual relationships
were with Bentham and the Mills, and, among his predecessors, with Hobbes and
Locke. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832);
MORRISON, JOHN AUSTIN 34-60 (1982) (discussing John Austin’s relationship with
Bentham and James and John Mill); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977) (stating ruling theory is composed of positivism and utilitarianism which is
derived from philosophy of Jeremy Bentham); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961) (referring to intellectual similarities between John Austin and Jeremy
Bentham and John and James Mill); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
(1963).
168. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (1863); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(1967).
169. See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., 1970). JAMES MILL, FRAGMENT ON MACKINTOSH (1835); JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM (1863); John Stuart Mill, Speech Before the House of Commons, 1868, in
HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (3d series, 1868); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr. ed., Cambridge University Press
1995) (1832).
170. See H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, 62 THE LISTENER 162-63 (1959);
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPAL (1985); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS (1993).
171. Hart’s training was not in law at all, but rather in philosophy. His
methodological debt to J.L. Austin could hardly be greater. Marshall Cohen writes
that:
If, as Hart thinks, the main task of jurisprudence is the analysis of legal
concepts, he has the special advantage of being not only a lawyer but also a
philosopher in command of the methods of conceptual and linguistic
analysis developed by Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein, G.E. Moore,
and Hart’s Oxford colleague, J.L. Austin.
Marshall Cohen, H.L.A. Hart, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1967).
172. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorer, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616
(1949); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-47 (1961); Summers, New Analytic
Jurists (1966), supra note 166; STEPHEN J. BURTON, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL
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late-twentieth-century critical theory and to the sources of that critical
theory in continental philosophy.173
The heirs to this tradition have a distinctive understanding of law
as a discipline and, more specifically, the boundaries and affiliations
that are appropriate to the discipline of law. For this group, the
discipline of law is defined narrowly so as to be distinctly separated
from, for instance, the study of sociology, psychology, economics,
virtually all forms of empiricism, and even attention to what judges
actually do.174 At the same time, through its close affiliation with
British philosophy, this school of legal theory gets its commitments to
analysis and clarification through the meaning of words,175 to its
particular form of “conceptual” analysis,176 to “coherence,”177
“integrity,”178 “fit,”179 “immanent rationality”180 and “intrinsic
ordering,”181 and to the view that language is largely determinate.182
REASONING (1995).
173. Their hostility to contemporary critical theory in law is entirely consistent
with their views on legal realism. See STEPHEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 13563 (1992). Their view of critical theory in general and of contemporary continental
philosophy is suggested by the fact that Dennis Patterson, in Law and Truth, can
argue for what he calls a “postmodern jurisprudence” solely with reference to the
writings of Anglophone philosophers. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH
(1996).
174. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Summers, New Analytic Jurists
(1966), supra 166.
175. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). In his Preface to The Concept of
Law, Hart explains that his book is “essay in analytical jurisprudence” and that it is
thus concerned with “the clarification of the general framework of legal thought”
and, more particularly, with “the meanings of words.” In defense of this focus, he
asserts that:
Many important distinctions, which are not immediately obvious, between
types of social situation or relationships may best be brought to light by an
examination of the standard uses of the relevant expressions . . . . In this
field of study it is particularly true that we may use, as Professor J.L. Austin
said, “a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the
phenomena.”
Id. at vii. Indeed, Hart’s training was as an ordinary language philosopher and
Professor Austin was his colleague. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); Summers, New Analytic Jurists (1966), supra note 166.
176. Summers, New Analytic Jurists (1966), supra note 166 (stating that conceptual
analysis has been a primary focus of old and new analytical jurists); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1968);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
177. See ROLF SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 196-97 (1975);
ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 37-48 (1990).
178. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
179. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 283-84 (1977); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
180. See generally Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
181. See generally Ernest Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 486
(1989).
182. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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Also through that affiliation, they acquire their distinctively
Aristotelian commitments to corrective and distributive justice183 and
to “practical reason,”184 to the appropriateness of reasoning about
some thing (e.g., human beings, tort law) from that which is either
essential or distinctive to that thing,185 and to the idea that things like
tort law might have yearnings or aspirations toward particular
ideals.186 Members of this community are inclined toward the beliefs
that moral knowledge is available, that such knowledge is unrelated
to our religious traditions, and that it is to be found instead in the last
two hundred years of British philosophy and political theory and in
those other texts (e.g., Aristotle and occasionally Kant) that have
been accepted into the canon of modern British philosophy.187 This,
in turn, is the source of their persistent flirtation with what is called
“moral realism.”188
Many of the modern heirs to this tradition seem predisposed, at
least to this outsider and at least as a relative matter, to see existing
hierarchies as both steep and legitimate, whether those hierarchies
be social, cultural, intellectual, or judicial.189 They sometimes exhibit
what, to an outsider, seems to be an unexplained confidence in the
wisdom, sufficiency, and superiority of the institutions, traditions, and

183. See Ernest Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37
(1983); Ernest Weinrib, Liberty, Community, and Corrective Justice, 1 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1988); Ernest Weinrib, Aristotle’s Forms of Justice, 2 RATIO JURIS 211
(1989); Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403 (1989);
Ernest Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. (1992). In various ways, each of
these is an elaboration of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
184. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS (1975); PRACTICAL REASONING
(J. Raz ed., 1978); Stephen J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747
(1989); STEPHEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992); see also BERNARD
WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1982).
185. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Ernest Weinrib, Understanding
Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 486 (1989). This is, it should be noted, a distinctly
Aristotelian form of definition.
186. See Ernest Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 486 (1989).
187. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
188. See Michael Moore, Moral Realism, 1982 WISC. L. REV. 1061; Michael Moore,
Moral Realism Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992); Brian Bix, Michael Moore’s
Realist Approach to Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1293-1331 (1992).
189. This assertion is warranted, if at all, by the confidence of this group that
judges actually do what they say they do, see HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW and
Summers, The New Analytic Jurists (1966), supra note 166; and that those trained in
British philosophy really do make better judgments than those who have not been so
trained, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); by their faith in the
rule of law and, accordingly, in the legitimacy of the existing order; by the
commitment to aristocracies that may come with their Aristotelianism, and by what I
will assert is the general faith of those educated within the upper reaches of British
society that—at least by American standards—existing hierarchies are fair and
legitimate. I do not mean to suggest that writers like Dworkin, Raz, and Waldron
may not, even quite regularly, take positions that are politically progressive.
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philosophy of Anglo-America and in the idea that the day-to-day
behavior of judges is in actual fact guided by the law, and not
personal preference, in exactly the way the judges say it is.190 They
often make and accept arguments from the presumed propriety of
existing arrangements191 and from the felt legitimacy of the system
and the felt duty to obey the law.192 They are inclined to see their own
work as the whole of jurisprudence and to dismiss those outside their
community for having “gotten it wrong,” by which they usually refer
to some supposed linguistic, conceptual, or philosophical error.193
Having said all that, their faith in the rule of law, however great,
expresses a commitment to liberal legalism that is distinguishable
only in degree from the commitment to liberal legalism that almost
all of us share.
G. Contemporary Critical Theory
Finally, we come to a legal perspective, or a set of legal
perspectives, that I shall call “contemporary critical theory.”194
Contemporary critical theory includes critical legal studies, feminist
legal theory, and critical race theory. It includes the work of Duncan
Kennedy,195 Mark Tushnet,196 Robert Gordon,197 Alan Freeman,198 Betty
190. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-47 (1961); Summers, New Analytic
Jurists (1966), supra note 166.
191. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134, passim (1961) (on the internal
perspective); Summers, New Analytic Jurists (1966), supra note 166.
192. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134, passim (1961) (on the internal
perspective).
193. See Summers, New Analytic Jurists (1966), supra note 166; see also STEPHEN J.
BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH xi (1992) (on “get[ting] it straight”); id. at 123 (on
Judge Posner’s “philosophical mistake”); id. at 157 (stating that radical critique of law
“rests on two . . . errors”).
194. Primary material reflecting the work of this community is cited in subsequent
notes. Secondary treatments include, e.g., Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 1982) [hereinafter Gordon, New
Developments (1982)]; Note, ‘Round and ‘Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to
Critical Legal Studies, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1666 (1982); John Henry Schlegel, Toward an
Intimate, Opinionated and Affectionate History of Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV.
391 (1983); ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990);
Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991). For
polemics against these forms of theory, see Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34
J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); Owen Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1986); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
195. Kennedy’s academic writings include, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209 (1979); Duncan
Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical
Legal Thought, 1850-1940, in CURRENT RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (J. Spitzer
ed., 1980); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort
Law with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education As Training for Hierarchy, in THE
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Mensch,199 Karl Klare,200 and Peter Gabel;201 of Martha Minow,202
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40-61 (D. Kairys ed., 1982); Duncan
Kennedy & Peter Gabel, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Duncan
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518 (1986); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705; DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. (1993);
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997).
196. Tushnet’s academic writing includes, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge
of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037
(1980); MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860 (1981); Mark
Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981); Mark
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and
Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); Mark Tushnet,
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502 (1985); MARK
TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950
(1987); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History,
100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
197. Gordon’s writings include, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Robert W. Gordon, Holmes’ Common Law as Legal
and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719-46 (1982); Gordon, New Developments
(1982), supra note 194; Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age
of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN
AMERICA 70 (G. Geison ed., 1983); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 57 (1984); Robert W. Gordon, Letter from Robert W. Gordon to Paul D.
Carrington, reprinted in ‘Of Law and the River,’ and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985); Robert W. Gordon, Law and Ideology, 3 TIKKUN 14 (1987);
Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 195 (1987); Robert W. Gordon, Law and Disorder, 64 IND. L.J. 803 (1989); Robert
W. Gordon, The Case for (and against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231 (1995).
198. Freeman’s major publications include Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination through Anti-discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Alan David Freeman, Race and Class: The
Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981); Alan David Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 295 (1988).
199. Mensch’s work includes, e.g., Elizabeth Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology,
33 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1981); Elizabeth Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property
Rights, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 635 (1982); Alan David Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The
Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1987).
200. Klare’s major publications include, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1978); Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of
Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981); Karl E. Klare, The Quest for
Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and
Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982); Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic
Reconstruction: Reflections of 1989, 25 U.B.C. L. REV. 69 (1991).
201. Gabel’s academic writings include, e.g., Peter Gabel, Phenomenology of
Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984);
Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Peter
Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1983); Peter Gabel, Reification
in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 25 (1980).
202. Minow’s major publications include, e.g., Martha Minow, Forming Underneath
Everything That Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819; Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987);
Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987);
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Catharine MacKinnon,203 and Robin West;204 of Derek Bell,205 Kimberle
Crenshaw,206 Pat Williams,207 and Richard Delgado,208 among a great
Martha Minow, Many Silent Worlds, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 197 (1987); Martha Minow,
Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Martha Minow,
Pluralisms, 21 CONN. L. REV. 965 (1989); Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 59; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Martha Minow, Repossession: Of History, Poverty,
and Dissent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1204 (1993); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40
UCLA L. REV. 1411 (1993); Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and
Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647 (1996).
203. MacKinnon’s major publications include, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)]; CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
204. West’s major publications include, e.g., Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman:
One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1988); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); Robin West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration of Authority,
83 NW. U. L. REV. 977 (1989); Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59; Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43
(1990); Robin West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473 (1990); Robin
West, Murdering the Spirit: Racism, Rights, and Commerce, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1771 (1992);
Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413 (1993); Robin
West, The Constitution of Reasons, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1409 (1994).
205. Bell’s works include, e.g., DEREK BELL, SHADES OF BROWN (1980); DEREK BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); DEREK BELL,
RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992); DEREK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); DEREK BELL, CONFRONTING
AUTHORITY:
REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTOR (1994); DEREK BELL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS (1997); DEREK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL
FOR AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME (1996).
206. Crenshaw’s major writings include, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1991); Foreword—Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33 (1994); Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The
Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683 (1998).
207. William’s academic writings include, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Spirit-Murdering
the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 127 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991)]; Patricia J.
Williams, Women of Color at the Center: Reordering Western Civ, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1437
(1991); Particia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 913 (1994).
208. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL
REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994); RICHARD DELGADO, THE PRICE
WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY
(1995); RICHARD DELGADO, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (1995);
RICHARD DELGADO, RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE
(1995); RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES
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many others.209
OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE (1996).
209. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); C. Edwin
Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975);
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Paul

Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Katherine Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed., 1982); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in
the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379; Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the
Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);
John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated and Affectionate History of
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1983); William Simon,
Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983); Gerald E.
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984);
Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1984); Mark G.
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); David M. Trubek, Where the
Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984); James
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 687 (1985); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Mary J. Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1377 (1985); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1151 (1985); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); J.M. Balkin,
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Charles R. Lawrence,
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO
MANGABERIA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1988); Gregory S.
Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1988); Guyora
Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1 (1987); Mary L.
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988); Martha
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal
Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or ‘The Fem-Crits Go to Law School’, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381
(1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
See also, e.g., Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (1990); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in
Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and
Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1411 (1990); DRUCILLA
CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE
LAW (1991); DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS: RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL IN JURISPRUDENCE
(Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1991): Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is ColorBlind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991); Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The
Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice: Some Observations and
Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993 (1991); Joseph William
Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Pierre Schlag, The Problem
of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991); Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public
International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509
(1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181 (1994);
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995); Carol Sanger, Girls and the
Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705
(1995); Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106
YALE L.J. 2375 (1997); Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the
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This community may be defined by its commitments both to
expansive understandings of equality and democracy, and to freedom
from illegitimate structures of domination. Its members also share
four fundamental beliefs. First, law is politics.210 Second, emphatic
claims for “the rule of law” are seriously mistaken, and indeed they
may simply be more-or-less transparent apologetics for those who
benefit from the way things are.211 Third, the existing order, by which
I mean the current distribution of power and wealth, is
fundamentally unfair and illegitimate, at least with respect to certain
groups.212 Fourth, the existing distribution of resources is held in
place by illegitimate structures of domination—based on race,
gender, or class—that are powerful, pervasive, and persistent.213
Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1997);
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, History as Explanation: Annals of American Political Economy, 22 L.
& SOC. INQ. 231 (1997); Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877
(1997); Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream
Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683 (1998); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).
210. See THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed., 1982);
Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 997-98 (1985); MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203 (law is an expression of male domination).
211. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW (D. Kairys ed., 1982); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (1988); David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 247 (1984); Joseph Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note
203 (criticizing objectivity as a specifically male stance); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991),
supra note 207 (arguing that claims of neutrality are unwarranted).
212. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203, at 169, 202
(law is unfair to women); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991), supra note 207; DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992)
(racism is inescapable); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, 24 CORNELL L. REV. 363
(1992) (racial equality is unattainable); DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992).
213. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203; Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1991); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991),
supra note 207. It is important to note that many within this community understand
the mechanisms of power and of domination and submission in a way that is
infinitely closer to Gramsci, de Beauvoir and Foucault’s understandings of these
matters than, say, to Locke’s. Catharine MacKinnon, for instance, offers feminism as
a theory of power and of the coherence, rationality, and pervasiveness of unjust
domination. But she also sees power and domination as largely extra-legal
constructs, domination, and submission as reciprocal relations, and sexuality as
whatever is constructed as erotic as well as a principle mechanism for the
objectification, control and domination of women. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203; see also Gordon, New Developments (1982), supra
note 197; Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 940 (1985) (arguing that “the totality
[of nineteenth-century classical economics and law] functioned ideologically: it
operated as a legitimator of oppression”); Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale
and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991) (noting the relationship between power
and knowledge), reprinted in KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, ETC. (1993); ANTONIO GRAMSCI,
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Although these four beliefs are shared by all members of this
community, it must be said that these beliefs are not absolute. Thus,
few will argue that the “law is absolutely and in all respects
indistinguishable from what we generally recognize as politics.”
Instead, the members of this community share a relatively strong belief
in the idea that law is politics. In other words, they believe that law is
politics in a way that, although not absolute, is consistently and
markedly stronger than the corresponding views of their adversaries
within the larger legal community.
If a relatively strong belief in these four matters is a condition of
membership in the contemporary critical theory community, most—
but not all—members of that community also hold an underlying
commitment to what I shall call the “social constructionist”
position.214 This is the view that much of what we know and believe is
not inherent in the world but is, instead, “socially constructed.”
Thus, most who operate within this perspective hold a (relatively)
constructionist understanding of the nature and consequences of
language, as well as the associated critiques of reason, neutrality, and
objectivity. Under this view, things (?) are cast into language in ways
that allow discovery in the world and that cause us to take them for
granted and see them as “natural” and “given.”215 They find such
“reification” (literally “thing-ification”) in our understandings of
rights, property, individual identity, and gender. Many will also speak
about the social construction, and thus the contingency of society,
liberalism, individualism, the rule of law—and even of the self.
Further, they will speak about the relation of “perspective” to
“knowledge”216 and the relation of “knowledge” to “power.”217 Here
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Quinton Hoare et al. trans., 1971); SIMONE
DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans., Bantam Books 1961) (1949);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I: AN INTRODUCTION 92-102
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78-133 (Colin
Gordon trans., 1980).
214. See Gordon, New Developments (1982), supra note 197 (asserting the social
constructionist position but also that certain “there’s” are really “there”);
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203 (asserting that domination
is socially constructed); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE (1989); Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985) (on false consciousness, law,
and de-reification).
215. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987); MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note
203, at 171-77 (asserting the constitutive effects of pornography); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); see also Karl Llewellyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence–The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930)
216. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1086 (1986) (critiquing claims of
objectivity, asserting that knowledge of facts relevant to the law is perspectival);
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203, at 50 (critiquing
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again, however, when we speak of a commitment to the social
constructionist position, we are speaking of a commitment that
although not absolute, is still relatively strong. Few, if any, proponents
of critical legal theory hold the absolute view that “there is no there
there” or that supposedly factual statements may not sometimes be
proven wrong. None would linguistically “reconstruct” a “wall” as a
“door” and then attempt to walk through that “door.” Nevertheless,
real differences on the matter of “social construction,” even if they
are only differences in degree, are some of the clearest demarcations
between the proponents and the opponents of critical theory.
Proponents of contemporary critical theory can also be understood
in terms of their distinctive projects, all of which express their core
commitments and their central beliefs. Much of this work seeks to
demonstrate the constructedness and the contingency of our settled
understandings, including our understandings about the law. Thus,
Robert Gordon suggests a “struggle” against “conventional beliefs” by
using “the ordinary rational tools of intellectual inquiry to expose
belief-structures that claim that things as they are must necessarily be
as they are.” The point of this “critical exercise,” he explains, “is to
unfreeze the world as it appears to common sense as a bunch of more
or less objectively determined social relations and to make it appear
as (we believe) it really is: people acting, imagining, rationalizing,
justifying.”218 Sometimes this is done by showing that “the beliefstructures that rule our lives are not found in nature but are
historically contingent.”219
Sometimes it is done through
objectivity as a stance); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE (1989); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990); WILLIAMS,
ALCHEMY (1991), supra note 207; see also ALAN D. SCHRIFT, NIETZSCHE AND THE
QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION: BETWEEN HERMENEUTICS AND DECONSTRUCTION 124-56
(1990); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, A GENEALOGY OF MORALS (William A. Haussman trans.,
1897).
217. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985); MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203; Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for
Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705; Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes
of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991), reprinted in SEXY DRESSING,
ETC. (1993); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991), supra note 207 (arguing that “standards” are
subjective preferences that have been institutionalized); Steven L. Winter, The
“Power” Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721 (1996). The texts that introduced this relationship
between knowledge and power include, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 78-133 (Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I: AN INTRODUCTION 92-102
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
218. Gordon, New Developments (1982), supra note 194, at 289.
219. Id.; see also Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Duncan Kennedy,
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demonstrations of law’s indeterminacy.220 And sometimes it is
expressly disruptive and oppositional, taking the form of arguments
variously known as critique, debunking, unmasking, unfreezing,
trashing and—a term that has both a technical and a colloquial
meaning—deconstruction.221
In all of these ways, proponents of contemporary critical theory
seek to demonstrate the constructedness and the contingency of
those settled understandings that hold in place, or perhaps that
simply are, the existing order. In all these ways, they seek to unmask
the operation of power and politics within legal discourse and to
expose the existence and operation of illegitimate structures of
domination. This first set of projects includes sustained critiques of
the distinction between public and private and between consent and
coercion, of our conventional understandings of individual rights
including rights in property, of the assumption that the market is
Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal
Thought, 1850-1940, in 3 CURRENT RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (J. Spitzer ed.,
1980); Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective
Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 452 (1981); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in
Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Elizabeth Mensch, The Colonial Origins of
Liberal Property Rights, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 635 (1982); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
220. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 209 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX.
L. REV. 1363 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing
Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997).
221. See Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE
L.J. 1880, 1887 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d
ed.)) (unmasking); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984)
(trashing); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984) (deconstruction); Clare Dalton, An Essay
in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985) (deconstruction);
Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of
Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 994 (1985) (dereification); Robert W. Gordon,
Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987)
(unfreezing); MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203, at 1-15, 3245 (setting out her “demystification” of “the substantive misogyny of liberal
neutrality” and critiquing constructions of gender difference); DRUCILLA CORNELL,
BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW (1991)
(deconstruction); see also JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Spivak trans.,
1976); FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS (1980); FRANK LENTRICCHIA,
AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM (1980); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY &
PRACTICE (1982).
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somehow natural and given, of the meaning of equality, and of the
meanings of the Constitution. Members of this community critique
our understandings of language, knowledge, racial and gender
differences, human nature, and even “the self.” And they critique
claims made in the name of reason, objectivity, nonproblematic
foundations, the possibilities of stable meaning, of legal reasoning,
and of the rule of law.222 Taken together, this is a sustained
demonstration that knowledge is perspectival and political, and that
law is indeterminate and political. If successful, it is thought to show
that many of the claims made on behalf of the existing distribution of
power and resources are false, incoherent, inherently contestable, or
simply bad faith apologetics.
Other projects pursued by the proponents of contemporary critical
theory reflect an affirmative commitment to change, usually in the
name of greater equality and democracy, and to empowering the
222. See Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978)
(equality, antidiscrimination law); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978)
(labor law); Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Alan D. Freeman, Race
and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880, 1887 (1981); Gordon, New
Developments (1982), supra note 194 (rights, including rights in property); Morton
Horwitz, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982)
(public and private); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (public and private); Paul Brest, State
Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1296 (1982) (public and private); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV.
1363 (1984) (rights); Peter Gabel, Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of
the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984) (rights); Duncan Kennedy, The Role
of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
939, 991-1001 (1985); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan D. Freeman, The Public-Private
Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237 (1987) (public and private);
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203 (arguing the limits and
contradictions of abstract equality and liberal neutrality); id. at 32-45 (constructing
equality not of a question of difference but of domination and subordination, of
hierarchy and force, and of the construction of social perception and social reality);
id. at 44 (constructing sex equality as involving the reasonable treatment of
differences is “part of the way male dominance is expressed in law”); id. at 86
(critiquing objectivity); Alan D. Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of
Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988) (critiquing
understandings of equality); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465
(1988) (critiquing distinctions between public and private, consent and coercion);
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (critiquing
understandings of equality, law of rape, abortion, pornography, discrimination);
Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803 (1990)
(critiquing equality); Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(1991) (critiquing rights, including rights in property); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991),
supra note 207, passim, 106 (critiquing equality; holding simultaneously to the views
that our essential selves are threatened by the possibility of domination and that our
selves are constructed; and that racial identities are threatened and that they, too, are
constructed).
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disempowered. This work sometimes involves the advocacy of legal
change, change that is often by its nature incremental. It may involve
promoting equality and democracy across boundaries of race,
gender, or class;223 promoting those values in the workplace;224
promoting diversity or affirmative action;225 or critiquing First
Amendment bars to the regulation of pornography and hate
speech.226 In these and other ways, they demonstrate that the law
could, in ways it does not, promote the ideals of equality and
democracy.227 Further, by interrogating the operation of hierarchy
and power, by consciousness-raising, and by narrative jurisprudence,
members of this community seek to expose the illegitimate structures
of domination. By so doing, they attempt to speak for, and
sometimes in the voices of, those on the margins and to empower the
disempowered.228
223. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978); MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra 203; CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY
(1991), supra note 207.
224. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against
Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982);
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203 (opposing sexual
harassment); Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda
for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management
Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39
(1988); Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction, 25 U.B.C. L. REV. 69
(1991) (arguing that the market structure should be designed to promote the ideal
of equality).
225. Derrick A. Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies,
67 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1979); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review
of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 566-73 (1984); MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203 (asserting that, from the perspective in which
differentiation is discrimination, “changing an unequal status quo is discrimination,
but allowing it to exist is not”); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE (1989); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action
in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705; WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991), supra note 207.
226. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203, at 129-30
(arguing that the First Amendment’s protection of pornography “promotes freedom
for men and enslavement and silence of women”); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993) (objecting to free speech for racists and arguing that racial equality is a
precondition of free speech).
227. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203 (arguing that
the law could and should protect women from violence, sexual abuse, sexual
harassment, pornography, rape).
228. Consciousness-raising is named and discussed as a strategy in CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989), and is found,
in practice, across an enormous range of literature. Interrogations of the workings
of power in law school include, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for
Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed., 1982); Gordon, New Developments
(1982), supra note 194, at 290. MacKinnon writes that: “What law school does for
you is this: it tells you that to become a lawyer means to forget your feelings, forget
your community, most of all, if you are a woman, forget your experience. Become a
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If this community is held together by a set of common
commitments and a linked set of projects, it also marked by a number
of important and visible differences, the resolution of which
differences may be largely unnecessary. Thus there have been
tensions and conflicts between the practitioners and the theorists and
between the liberals and the radicals. Some of the work done within
this community is devoted to the possibilities of incremental change,
while some is committed, instead, to unmasking incrementalism as a
strategy doomed to perpetuate existing structures of domination.
Some of its work is committed to the construction and vindication of
rights, while other such work is no less committed to demonstrating
the incoherence and disutility of rights-discourse. Some of this
group’s work is done within the domain of legal reasoning, while
other such work seeks to prove law’s indeterminacy, the inseparability
of law from politics, and thus the bankruptcy of legal reasoning.
Equality is sometimes pursued through efforts to end discrimination
and eliminate formal inequalities in the ways that people are treated,
and it is sometimes pursued through a critique of formal equality and
through efforts to promote the politics of identity and the rhetoric of
diversity. Empowerment is sometimes sought through demands for
the accommodation of differences (e.g., of race or gender) and
sometimes by proofs that those differences, or our understandings of
those differences, are merely a social construction. Finally, and at the
highest level of abstraction, most of the work of this community is
done within the master paradigm of liberalism, and within the
assumption that we live in a political society comprised of rightsbearing individuals, while some of the work of this community is a
full-throated critique of liberalism as a set of beliefs that needlessly
privileges separateness, individualism, and disregard for others.
I think these are, in the end, primarily differences in emphasis and
in the selection of projects and of particular tools that are
appropriate to the diverse tasks at hand. They are as likely to be
found within the work of a single member of this community as they

maze-bright rat.” MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203, at 205.
The related literature of (and counter-literature against) narrative jurisprudence
continues to expand. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1086 (1986); Patricia
J. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2128 (1989); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381
(1989); Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 16 2411 (1989); WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991), supra
note 207; see also, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539; Derrick
A. Bell, The Final Report: Harvard’s Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382
(1989).
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are to be found between different members or sub-communities.229 I
do not take them to be signs of deep division, of inconsistency or
even (as some might have it) of hypocrisy, but rather as evidence of
this community’s consistent commitment to equality, democracy, and
freedom from oppression.
II. DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENCE
The differences between, and among, these theoretical
perspectives can be described in a great many different ways. In a
certain sense, each perspective entails a complete discursive system
and, accordingly, a complete rhetorical universe.
Each is
characterized by specifiable assumptions and beliefs, and by
distinctive forms of analysis and argument. Each is characterized by
particular areas of interest, by a set of questions with which it is
especially concerned, and by a unique set of intellectual and
normative commitments.
My purpose in this section is to sketch the structure of the differing
assumptions, beliefs, and commitments that mark and distinguish our
six communities. In doing so, I will lay out the basic differences on
which issues could be joined and on which argument could be
sustained between the proponents of these otherwise incompatible
theoretical perspectives. Further, if I am right about the structure of
our differences in legal discourse, this effort should, in the degree to
which it is successful, shed light on the more particular, doctrinal
matters on which we reach divergent conclusions.
229. Robert Gordon, in his early essay titled New Developments, discusses many of
these themes, including the differences and the barriers between theorists and
practitioners. See Gordon, New Developments (1982), supra note 194. He describes a
single community that is simultaneously (1) attracted by the possibility of activist
reform lawyering, through which the system may sometimes be compelled to make
good on its utopian promises and (2) deeply disenchanted with liberal legalism and
driven to understand its illusions and contradictions. See id. at 286. Ours is, he
suggests, a situation in which “hard-won struggles to achieve new legal rights for the
oppressed” may produce “real gains” but may do so in ways that are inherently selflimiting and that ultimately strengthen the illegitimate structures of domination. See
id.
For her part, Catharine MacKinnon moves easily back and forth between appeals
to end such formal inequalities as sexual harassment and the legal subordination of
women as women and a devastating critique of the insufficiency and “the substantive
misogyny” of liberal neutrality, formal equality and law’s supposed objectivity. See
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203. I don’t think a generous
reader will find any incompatibility between these two forms of work, or between
these forms of work and Professor MacKinnon’s understandings of power and of law.
Nor is Patricia William’s “devoutly wish[ing] this to be a colorblind society, in which
removing the words ‘black’ and ‘white’ from our vocabulary would render the world,
in a miraculous flash, free of all division” and her continuing real-world commitment
to the politics of racial identity. See WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY (1991), supra note 207, at 83
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I will take up ten “dimensions of difference” on which one may sort
and distinguish these six communities. In the order of their
presentation, they are:
(1) the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order;
(2) prime values and projects;
(3) focus and center of attention;
(4) human nature and social existence;
(5) the nature and consequences of language;
(6) the nature of knowledge and the possibilities of reason
and objectivity;
(7) the relationship between law and other disciplines;
(8) interpretive strategies and forms of argument;
(9) the possibility of the rule of law; and
(10) the consequences of speaking against either of the
above.
Ideally, I should like to explain the relationship between these
elements, and identify those elements that matter most and those
differences from which the other differences might flow. The most I
can do, however, is to offer a handful of speculations. Thus one’s
sense of the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order (item 1)
seems to determine, or at least to motivate and inform, many of one’s
judgments on the other nine elements. Similarly, one’s prime values
(item 2) may be entailed in one’s assessment of the existing order,
and one’s projects (also item 2) may flow more or less directly from
that assessment and those prime values. So may the focus of one’s
activity and attention (item 3) flow from one’s prime values and
projects. In this way, the first three “dimensions of difference” bear a
special relationship to one another.
Another such cluster might include our understandings of human
nature and social existence (item 4); the nature and consequences of
language (item 5); and the nature of knowledge and the possibilities
of reason and objectivity (item 6). Within this group, I assume we
obtain first a rough understanding of human nature, and that at
some point in our development, these three elements begin to
develop in tandem with one another. In the course of that
development, I imagine we also acquire both our ideas about the
other academic disciplines that may bear most importantly upon our
understanding of the law (item 7) and our commitments to
particular interpretive strategies and forms of argument (item 8).
Next, we come to the possibility of the rule of law (item 9). Our
beliefs in this area may flow fairly directly from our assessment of the
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fairness and legitimacy of the existing order, including the existing
legal order (item 1), and from beliefs regarding human nature (item
4), the nature and consequences of language (item 5) and, perhaps
most importantly, the nature of knowledge and the possibilities of
reason and objectivity (item 6).
Finally, our beliefs concerning the consequences of speaking
against the possibilities of reason, objectivity and the rule of law (item
10) are informed by our assessments of the legitimacy of the existing
order (item 1), the possibilities of reason and objectivity (item 6), the
possibility of the rule of law (item 9), the nature and consequences of
language (item 5), all flowing through our choice of projects (item
2). Viewed in this way we can understand, though not simultaneously
share, critiques of the rule of law that have been made by, among
countless others, Jerome Frank,230 Duncan Kennedy,231 and Catharine
MacKinnon,232 as well as the critiques of those critiques that have
been made by Alexander Bickel,233 Paul Carrington,234 and Owen
Fiss.235 Again, I trust my reader to understand that the relationships I
am suggesting among these elements are the barest hypotheses.
What seems clear is that there exist relationships among these
elements, or dimensions of difference, that are worth trying to
understand.
If there are relationships among these various dimensions of
difference, there are also, as I have earlier suggested, certain broad
patterns that exist among our six communities of belief. At the
broadest level, there may be two large camps separated by a Great
Divide. In one camp there is the Grand Alliance of the Faithful
(“Team Faithful”) and, in the other, the League of Skeptics (“Team
Skepticism”). In terms of the ten dimensions of difference, we find
230. Jerome N. Frank, Beale, and Legal Fundamentalism, in LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1935).
231. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 209 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education
As Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40-61 (D.
Kairys ed., 1982); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
232. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), supra note 203; CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
233. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 81-82
(attacking “neo-realists” and “nihilists,” such as Thurman Arnold, for their “cynicism”
and for “propagating a self-validating picture of reality”).
234. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984) (arguing that critical legal studies is nihilism and there is no place for
nihilism, or for nihilists, in the legal academy).
235. See Owen Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1986) (arguing
that critical legal studies threatens the very existence of the law).
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on Team Faithful those who have a relatively high degree of faith in
the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order (item 1); the
possibility that language can hold stable and determinate meaning
(item 5); the possibilities of knowledge, reason, and objectivity (item
6); and the possibility they know as “the rule of law”(item 8). In
contrast, Team Skeptical holds a relatively low degree of faith in each
of these matters. As previously suggested, Team Faithful includes
most of the proponents of turn-of-the-century formalism, the legal
process school, law and economics, and the legal positivist/analytic
tradition. It may also include those legal realists whose faith in the
social sciences exceeds their skepticism of formalist logic and the rule
of law. For its part, Team Skeptical claims the remainder of the legal
realists as well as the proponents of contemporary critical theory.
This formulation, however useful, must obviously be taken with a
grain of salt. Members of these two large groups certainly do not
agree on all matters, even with the members of their own group.
Indeed, the members of Team Faithful represent a number of quite
different systems of belief and, accordingly, they may not even all
speak the same language. Just as there are individuals who do not fit
neatly into any one of our communities, there are those who are
affiliated, in one way or another, both with Team Faithful and with
Team Skeptical. And there are times when this great two-part
division takes on the appearance of a continuum, or even of multiple
and intersecting continua. But even if these differences are only
differences in degree, they are also differences that matter to our
understanding of and to our work within the law.
In describing these dimensions of difference, my first purpose is to
probe the particular problems that afflict legal discourse—namely the
problems of incommensurability, mutual unintelligibility, mutual
disrespect, and unjoined argument—and to identify the
commitments and characteristics that distinguish the six systems of
belief and argument. The second purpose of this section is to
identify a series of basic differences on which issue could actually be
joined and to locate those differences, crucial to our understandings
of the law, in terms of the centuries-old debates of which they are a
part.
A. The Fairness and Legitimacy of the Existing Order
This first dimension of difference involves differing beliefs
concerning the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order and of
the existing distribution of power and resources within our society.
For some, this is a matter of differing beliefs concerning the power,
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pervasiveness, and persistence of illegitimate structures of
domination (sometimes known by the acronym P.P.P.I.S.D.) based on
race, gender, sexual orientation, class, or wealth. Differences in this
dimension may also extend to, or to be correlated with, differences in
the degree to which the existing legal order is thought to conform to
the strong version of the rule of law. They also extend to differences
in the degree to which the law’s existing procedures—namely the
systems of democratic politics and of civil and criminal justice—are
seen as fair and evenhanded.
Differing beliefs concerning the fairness and legitimacy of the
existing order correspond quite closely to the distinction between
Team Faithful and Team Skeptical. The members of Team Faithful
see the existing order as generally fair and legitimate, and that team
includes most practitioners of turn-of-the-century formalism, the legal
process school, law and economics, and the legal positivist/analytic
tradition. For their part, the members of Team Skeptical have their
doubts. In one degree or another, and across one or more
dimensions, Team Skeptical sees the existing distribution of power
and resources as relatively unfair and illegitimate. Unlike their
Faithful adversaries, they see illegitimate structures of domination
and they believe those structures to be powerful, pervasive, and
persistence. For purposes of this “dimension of difference,” the
members of Team Skeptical include many of the legal realists and all
of the practitioners of contemporary critical theory.
B. Prime Values and Projects
Our six schools of thought also differ with regard to what we might
call the “prime values” to which they are devoted.
Turn-of-the-century formalists cannot be reasonably understood
without reference to their commitments to order and stability; to
promoting law’s claim to academic status through, for instance, their
claim that their work is scientific; to conceptual clarity understood in
terms of progressive simplification; and to economic freedom. For
their part, the legal realists, at least in the first generation, were
devoted to the public interest they saw embedded in progressive
legislation and the work of the New Deal, to economic justice, and,
perhaps to those ends, to demystifying the work of the courts, to
exposing the personal and political judgments embedded in existing
law, and to a critique of formalist logic. In their turn, the legal
process school pursued, above all else, the legitimacy of judicial and
other governmental action, the separation of law from politics,
respect for the law and for the possibility of neutral and objective
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reason, and the correct design of our legal processes. Law and
economics is marked by its commitment to allocative efficiency and
the maximization of aggregate wealth, to the work of freely operating
perfect markets, and to the belief that government action is justified
by the absence of a market or by the presence of some market failure
(e.g., public goods, externalities, free riders).
The legal
positivist/analytic tradition often takes, as its prime values, the
legitimacy of judicial behavior and existing institutions, conceptual
clarification in the manner of ordinary language philosophy, the
separation of law from politics, and the separation of law from
religious morality. Finally, contemporary critical theory pursues
commitments to its expansive understandings of equality, democracy,
and economic justice, to the empowerment of the disempowered, to
existential freedom, and, perhaps to those ends, to exposing and
deconstructing illegitimate structures of domination and loosening
regard for order and stability, faith in the possibility of objective
reason, and faith in the authority and legitimacy of the law.
A further word is warranted on the subject of what is called “the
public interest.” More than any other of our six communities, it is
the legal realists who invoked this term, and what they had in mind
was a diverse set of consequentialist or instrumental purposes that
they saw as unproblematically promoting the good of the entire
society. Nonetheless, members of our other communities also believe
that the prime values they promote is beneficial, if not essential, to
society as a whole. Thus, turn-of-the-century formalists clearly
believed that order and stability were to be valued, at least in part,
because they promoted the public interest. Proponents of legal
process clearly believe that it is in the public interest to promote the
rule of law and the legitimacy of judicial action. Practitioners of law
and economics generally see aggregate wealth as an important
measure, and perhaps the only valid measure, of the public good.
And members of the positivist/analytic tradition surely understand
their efforts to “get things right” and to maximize the law’s clarity and
coherence as promoting the public good, albeit a nonconsequentialist understanding of the public good.
C. Centers of Activity and Attention
While the members of our six communities have worked
throughout the entire range of the law, each of these communities
also has its own distinctive focus, or center of attention, within the
law. Such centers of attention may reflect a community’s substantive
commitments, as with contemporary critical theory’s commitments to
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race, gender, and equality. They may reflect a preoccupation with a
particular problem, as in the case of the legal process school’s
concern with the legitimacy of judicial review. Or they may arise
from an affinity between a community’s particular methods and
particular areas of the law, as with the relationship between law and
economics and the law of antitrust and economic regulation.
With that introduction, we might observe that the turn-of-century
formalism takes as the center of its attention the concepts comprising
private common law (e.g., property, torts, contracts) and the case
against reform and regulation, including the constitutional
impediments to statutory reform.
The realists directed their
attention in exactly the opposite direction, namely to “the facts,” to
statutory reform including economic regulation, and, like the
formalists but for opposite purposes, to the constitutional
impediments to statutory reform. Next, the legal process school
focused on constitutional and administrative law, on theories of
judicial review and constitutional adjudication, on the proper role of
the courts, and more generally on the design of institutional
arrangements and legal processes. Originally, the focus of law and
economics was on antitrust and other forms of economic regulation,
though that focus has widened to include the entire body of common
law and virtually everything else, including the law of crimes, families,
and sexual behavior. The legal positivist/analytic tradition privileges
the private common law (as did the formalists), as well as the subject
of “general jurisprudence,” theories of legitimate adjudication, the
duty to obey, and the clarification of concepts. Finally, contemporary
critical theory takes as its centers of attention the indeterminacy of
law, the politics of law and reason, the social construction of
hierarchy, illegitimate structures of domination based on class, race
and gender, and the law of equality.
D. Human Nature
The next dimension of difference involves differing assumptions,
beliefs, and commitments concerning the nature of human beings
and the place of reason within that nature. This is not one of those
tidy dimensions in which there is a single continuum along which all
the proponents of order are at one end and all of the proponents of
change, at the other. Indeed we here confront at least five basic
distinctions—and thus as many axes or continua—each having its
own relationship to our six systems of belief. Despite this complexity,
an appreciation of our differences on these matters is absolutely
essential to an understanding of contemporary legal discourse.
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1.

Individual v. social
It has for some time been clear that some people assume that we
humans are originally and by our first nature individuals, while others
believe instead that we are by that first nature members of
communities. In modern legal discourse, the formalists and the law
and economics school are strongly predisposed to see us as
individuals, while the early legal realists and the proponents of
contemporary critical theory tend to see us as, by our first nature,
members of communities. This difference is reflected in the
individualistic understanding of liberty shared by the Lochner Court
and Robert Bork; in the legal realists’ understanding of the public
interest; and in contemporary debates over discrimination, colorblindness, and identity politics.
While these differences are
sometimes clear, it remains true that almost all members of our six
communities share at least the weak commitment to individualism
that characterizes the master paradigm of legal liberalism.
2.

Pessimism v. optimism
On the subject of human nature, it has probably always been true
that some people are fundamentally optimistic while others are just as
fundamentally pessimistic. Somewhat separately, there are optimists
and pessimists with respect to the possibility of collective or state
action. And some of those who are pessimistic about the possibility of
collective or state action are profoundly optimistic about the power of
the market to produce good results out of man’s selfish nature.
Optimists on the possibility of collective or state action, particularly in
the form of legislative reform, include the legal realists and others
who supported the New Deal. The formalists, including the Lochner
Court, were correspondingly pessimistic about the possibility of
collective action through legislative reform. Proponents of the strong
version of law and economics are pessimistic about the possibility of
collective or state action but optimistic about the market. As to
human nature itself, the formalists, the legal process school, and the
legal positivist/analytic tradition all seem optimistic about the
capacities of the elite even if they do not have the same faith in the
people at large; while proponents of legal realism and contemporary
critical theory profess far more optimism in the people at large than
in the governing elites.
3.

“Tissue of civility” thin v. thick
Closely related to the distinction between the pessimists and the
optimists is the further distinction between those who believe the
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“tissue of civility” to be thin (e.g., legal process) and those others who
take that “tissue” to be thick (legal realism, contemporary critical
theory). Those to whom the tissue of civility seems thin primarily
include the members of the legal process community who came of
age in the shadow of the Third Reich, Pearl Harbor, the Holocaust,
Hiroshima, and the early years of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, to
this group what mattered most was the preservation of order and the
rule of law, while nihilism and incivility were among the greatest sins.
On the other end of this continuum, those who take the tissue of
civility to be thick—indeed perhaps too thick—are the firstgeneration legal realists and the proponents of contemporary critical
theory. To this group, demystifying the rule of law is factually
warranted and can do nothing “worse” than opening things up a bit,
clearing space for change, and expanding the possibilities of
democracy, equality, and ethical responsibility.
These differences were compounded and etched into the soul of
American law in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During those years,
the legal process community and others of the 1950s generation—
those who took the tissue of civility to be thin, and whose prime
values included order, civility, and respect for the law—found
themselves on the inside of the academic barricades, cast as the
defenders of the status quo. Facing them from the other side of
those barricades were the early proponents of contemporary critical
theory and others of the 1960s generation—all of whom took the
tissue of civility to be thick, and whose prime values decidedly did not
include order, civility, and respect for the existing order. For those
on the inside, their adversaries were widely understood to be the
forces of lawlessness and disorder—simple hooligans. And for those
on the outside, their adversaries were the co-opted apologists of
hierarchy, racism, oppression, and colonial war. Within a very short
time, this conflict and these constructions became permanently
inscribed in American law.
4.

The place of reason
As to the place of reason in human nature and human affairs,
some—chiefly the members of Team Faithful—either assume that
humans always act rationally (law and economics), take reason to be
the very essence of human nature (e.g., the Aristotelians of the legal
positivist/analytic tradition), or see it as the only road to progress and
salvation (legal process). At the same time, others, mostly members
of Team Skepticism, see reason as significantly less powerful and less
central to man’s life, sometimes as an appealing delusion, and
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sometimes as the source of our greatest errors. This second group
includes the legal realists, except when they become credulous of the
possibilities of social science, and the proponents of contemporary
critical theory.
5.

Innate nature v. social construction
Finally, some see our views about human nature and the structure
of society as reflecting “real” facts about our actual and innate nature,
while others take those views to be contingent and “socially
constructed.” In various ways, this controversy extends to the
differences that may exist between men and women, blacks and
whites, gays and straights; to matters of personal, sexual, and racial
identity; to questions of hierarchy and class; to debates involving
nature, nurture, and the genetic sources of human behavior; and to
the timeless question of free will.
Our differences concerning human nature are enormously
complex and have been the subject of debate for thousands of years.
For all this complexity, there are some things that can usefully be said
about the relationship between these differences and our six systems
of belief. For instance, Team Faithful—formalism, legal process, law
and
economics,
and
the
positivist/analytic
tradition—is
distinguished, if not defined, by its high and certain faith in reason.
That said, this large group can be further broken down in terms of
their particular understandings of rationality. Thus, the strong
version of law and economics is irrevocably committed to its
assumption of economic rationality; legal process to its
understandings of “neutral principles”; and large segments of the
legal positivist/analytic tradition may be defined by its Aristotelian
understandings of humanity and reason. Team Skeptical—legal
realism and contemporary critical theory—is, for its part,
distinguished if not defined by its distrust of certain forms of human
reason. At the same time, the legal process school tends towards a
particular understanding of the place of reason in human affairs, and
a fear that the tissue of civility is thin, while the proponents of legal
realism and contemporary critical theory evidence a clear belief that
the tissue of civility is quite thick.
However complex might be a map of our differences concerning
human nature and the place of reason within that nature, those
differences are enormously important. They inform our choice of
legal theoretical perspectives and, even if they cannot be resolved,
these differences can be identified. Once identified, they can and
ought to be made the subject of discussion, argument, and counter-
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argument. And it seems clear that time would be better spent trying
to understand how to engage in arguments about these differences
than in simply holding to our different and unargued positions and
shouting our disagreements about the diverse and incompatible
implications of those different positions.
E. The Nature and Consequences of Language
We come next to the dimension of difference that reflects our
differing understandings of both the nature and the consequences of
language, including the possibility of stable meaning and the
problem of indeterminacy. I know of no intellectual terrain more
difficult than this one. This debate has been joined not just be legal
scholars but also philosophers,236 linguists,237 anthropologists,238
literary theorists,239 historians,240 sociologists,241 and others.242 And it is
a debate that I understand only in the most partial and preliminary
way. With that enormous caveat, I find it useful to see our larger
community as divided into two large and competing subcommunities. Following the lead of others, I will call them Team
Serious and Team Rhetoric.243 In its shortest form, the distinction
between the two is that Team Serious sees language as potentially
transparent while Team Rhetoric sees it as constitutive. Each of these
contrary understandings of language then entails an equally contrary
understanding of the world and of the law. In terms of the
236. See A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC (1936); BENJAMIN LEE WHORF,
LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY (J. Carroll ed., 1956); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans., 1958); J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO
THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969).
237. See FREDERICK SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1983).
238. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1962); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); WRITING CULTURE: THE
POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (J. Clifford & G. Marcus eds., 1986).
239. See Cleanth Brooks, The Formalist Critic, 13 KENYON REV. 72 (1951); E.D.
HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967); Stanley Fish, Interpreting the Variorum,
2 CRITICAL INQUIRY 465 (1976); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976) (1967).
240. See DOMINICK LACAPRA, RETHINKING INTELLECTUAL HISTORY:
TEXTS,
CONTEXTS, LANGUAGE (1983); HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE
DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION (1987).
241. See KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936); PETER BURGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
242. See KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION (1966); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1970).
243. See Stanley Fish, Rhetoric, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989)
(drawing a distinction between Serious Man and Rhetorical Man, which is in turn
drawn from RICHARD LANHAM, THE MOTIVES OF ELOQUENCE (1976)).
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distinction drawn in the introduction to this section, Team Serious is
closely affiliated with the Alliance of the Faithful and Team Rhetoric,
with the League of Skeptics.
To say that Team Serious sees language as potentially transparent,
and as not constitutive, is to say that for them, there is a world that is
unproblematically “out there,” and language provides us with a
potentially clear way of transmitting information about that world
from one person to another. That world is unaffected by the
language that we or others may use to describe it. In its more
extreme versions, this view applies to concepts and moral judgments
as well as the things of the world. The meaning of a particular text
may be unclear, but the possibility of clear and stable meaning selfevidently exists. In the case of a clear text, meaning is determinate
and stable and it may be found either through reference to the text
itself or, in a pinch, through reference to the intentions of the
author. For Team Serious, language itself has no consequences
though we, of course, have the capacity either to use it well or to get
it wrong.
For its part, Team Rhetoric sees language as constitutive and not as
potentially transparent. For them, the world and the self are
constructed through speaking. In the most extreme version, Team
Rhetoric does not hold that our understanding of the world comes to
us through speaking and language, but that the world itself actually
arises in our speaking and in our language. It is from this extreme
position that one can intelligibly say that “there is no there there.”
Language is the process by which the world, or at least the world as
we know it, comes into existence. It is Team Rhetoric that sees things
as “socially constructed,” whether those things are either concepts or
the world at its most concrete, and whether they are our
understanding of justice, law, and doctrine; our understanding of
human nature and social institutions; or our understandings of
gender and our own personal selves. All members of Team Rhetoric
see language, and thus also the law, as inherently unstable and
indeterminate.
Although many people hold to relatively moderate positions along
the continuum between Team Serious and Team Rhetoric, the
differences even between these moderate positions are serious and
sometimes intractable. Take, as an example, the word “rhetoric.” To
Team Serious, the word is always prefaced by “mere,” express or
implied, and it refers to linguistic ornamentation.244 It is difficult for
244. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 20-21, 23 (1992).
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them to grasp, and almost impossible for them to take seriously, what
their adversaries mean by the inherent and pervasive rhetoricity of
language. Similarly, Team Rhetoric has the greatest difficulty in
imagining that Team Serious could really mean what they are saying.
To one team, the other is a gang of nihilists who cannot mean what
they say. To the other, their adversaries are apologists, probably
speaking in bad faith by intentionally overstating the possibility of
reason and objectivity.
F.

The Nature of Knowledge and the Possibilities of Reason and Objectivity

Next after human nature and the nature and consequences of
language, we come to differing beliefs concerning the nature and
possibility of reason, including differences concerning the possibility
of non-problematic foundations, as well as the possibilities of
neutrality and objectivity. Here, as elsewhere, we find the Team
Faithful arrayed against Team Skeptical. Members of Team Faithful
have a relatively high degree of faith in the possibility of reason—or,
more specifically, faith in the idea that reason works, that it can get a
grip on the truth, that it has (or at least can have) influence over
human affairs, and that it is (or at least can be) rational, objective,
and politically neutral. In the opposite camp, we find those who are
relatively skeptical of the possibility of reason and who believe that
the whole business of reasoned argument, of logic and of “policy
analysis” is not nearly so conclusive and authoritative as their
proponents would have us believe.
Thus there is a great division, or more exactly a continuum,
between those who are relatively credulous and those who are
relatively skeptical with respect to the possibility of reason. I speak of
a continuum and use terms like “relatively” credulous because these
are differences not in kind but in degree. Clearly, even the most
skeptical among us still has enough faith in the possibility of reason
to conduct his business through language, through written texts, and
through arguments. But this difference in degree is still a difference
that matters, especially in terms of its consequences for our
understandings of the neutrality and objectivity of arguments—and
for the legitimacy of what we call the rule of law.
Among those who have a high level of faith in the possibilities of
neutral and objective reason, some, but not all, will assert that our
concepts and categories are real, actual, and natural things. This is
the position of the philosophical “realists,” a group named for their
belief in the “reality” of such things, and a group that could not be
further removed from those we know as “legal realists.” Subject to
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certain differences as to where these “realities” are to be found, this is
the position both of the Platonists and of the Aristotelians among
us.245 Some among Team Faithful, a subset of the philosophical
realists, support strong claims for the possibility of reason through
the assertion that our moral understandings are understandings of
real things—real like the color green is real or some particular table
is real. This is the position of the “moral realists.”246 Again, because
the risks of confusion are so great, the position of the “moral realists”
could not be further from, or in greater opposition to, the position of
the “legal realists.”
There is then another and much larger group, including the
philosophical realists among a great many others, who support strong
claims for the possibility of reason with the belief that, in matters of
public and normative discourse, people have access to nonproblematic foundations or starting points from which reasoning may
satisfactorily proceed. What is most remarkable, though, is the
variety, the range, and the utter incompatibility of these supposedly
non-problematic starting points. Among them are various and
conflicting ideas of the natural rights of individuals to equality,
freedom, autonomy, liberty of contract, the sanctity of property, and
appropriate levels of food and well-being, as well as the rights of
autonomous peoples.247 They also include various forms of natural
law, whether based on the texts of our theological traditions or
classical antiquity or upon the “internal morality” of law.248 And they
include various and conflicting ways of assigning meanings to legal

245. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941); ARISTOTLE,
METAPHYSICS, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II 19, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO ARTISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., 1947); see also DAVID ROSS, PLATO’S THEORY OF IDEAS (1951).
246. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Moral Realism, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061; Michael
Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992).
247. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (identifying rights to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785) (asserting right to autonomy); UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc
A/810 (1948) (identifying rights to work, fair pay, health, well-being, social security,
etc.); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (asserting rights to
property and to freedom in its use); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (same).
248. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941); ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS AND POLITICS, reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO ARTISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., 1947); CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA (51 B.C.) (G.H. Sabine & S.B.
Smith, trans. 1929); AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1265-73); JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON
THE LAW OF NATURE (1660-64); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940);
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987); NATURAL
LAW (John Finnis ed., 1991).
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texts by reference to their plain or literal meaning;249 their plain
meaning as supplemented by necessary or appropriate implications;250
their original meaning or intention;251 the purposes taken to be
inherent in them;252 their meaning in light of the policies and
purposes that current decision-makers ought to promote, whatever
these might be;253 neutral principles;254 institutional competence;255
consensus;256
conceptual
clarity;257
coherence;258
immanent
rationality;259 or some supposedly non-problematic strategy for
assigning meaning to cases.
When we move from the faithful to the skeptical end of the
continuum, from the group whose adversaries call it credulous to the
group whose adversaries call it nihilistic, we find those who see the
methods of reasoned argument to be historically contingent,
inherently incomplete, less neutral, and less objective than their
proponents will let on. Such observers see these methods as
inevitably serving the interests of some people while disserving the
interests of others, and as having less to do with truth than with
power. And they see much that is done in the name of neutral and
objective reason as heavily influenced, if not controlled, by post-hoc
rationalizations. Those at the skeptical end of the continuum will
also assert that our particular understandings, concepts, forms of
reasoning, and claims of foundation are contingent and socially
249. The views of Justice Scalia and Judge Kozinski are set out in supra note 78. It
is also customary on this question to cite Justice Roberts who said:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the
government has only one duty – to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
250. See McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, J.);
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.).
251. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
252. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958), supra note 65.
253. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1998), supra note 118 (assuming
that the law’s purpose is the maximization of aggregate wealth).
254. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 353 (1959); ALEXANDER BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note
73.
255. See supra note 95.
256. See supra note 97.
257. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
258. See ROLF SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND SOCIAL NORMS 196-97 (1975);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 283-84 (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
259. See Ernest Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 486 (1989);
Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949
(1988).
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constructed. Even if they are not simply rationalizations, they still
constitute decisions that we or others have made. Further, they are
commitments that have important effects on the distribution of
power and resources, on our understandings of ourselves and our
world, and on our ability to imagine alternative arrangements. Such
commitments exercise great power over us, not least because we are
continually granting them the status of natural (unconstructed) facts.
Our differences as to the nature and possibility of reason are very
great indeed, and those differences account for a great many of the
arguments without end. We spend enormous amounts of time on
arguments that, because of these differences on the matter of reason,
can never be resolved. Again, we might be far better off taking even a
small fraction of the time spent on such arguments and trying to
sustain a conversation on the nature of our knowledge and the
possibilities of reason and objectivity.
G. The Relationship between Law and Other Disciplines
Here we are concerned with differing assumptions and beliefs
concerning the relative autonomy of the law and the relationship of
the law to other academic disciplines. There is, on this dimension of
difference, a wide range of positions with respect to the law’s
autonomy from, or dependence upon, other intellectual disciplines.
A person’s views on these matters will be consistent with her
understanding of justice and with her beliefs concerning the
foundations or starting points from which reasoning may properly
proceed. And each of the six theoretical perspective has its unique
position, or positions, on this question.
To the Langdellian formalists, law was intellectually free-standing
and autonomous. To the legal realists, it is properly, even necessarily,
informed by the full range of social scientific disciplines including
sociology, anthropology, Freudian and perhaps other forms of
psychology, history, politics, and economics. To the legal process
school, the law is generally autonomous but is sometimes usefully
informed by political science. To the proponents of law and
economics, it is properly informed only by the single social science of
economics. To those in the legal positivist/analytic tradition, the law
is properly informed only by the traditions of British political theory
and British philosophy (including, by incorporation, Aristotle). And
to the proponents of critical theory, the law is properly informed by
the Continental tradition of philosophy, phenomenology, and
existential psychology; by distinctly contemporary, usually poststructuralist, forms of anthropology and literary theory; and by the
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tradition of American philosophical pragmatism.
In the end, we see a shifting pattern of commitments with respect
to the autonomy of law and to inter-disciplinary affiliations. We find
law as one of the arenas in which various contests between various
philosophical traditions (e.g., the British and the Continental) and
between various incompatible disciplines (e.g., neo-classical
economics on the one hand and sociology or anthropology on the
other) are continuously being played out.
H. Interpretive Strategies and Forms of Argument
As between the six basic perspectives, there are also differences in
the nature and form of arguments they make, not just in terms of the
objectives for which they argue—their prime values—but in terms of
their interpretive and argumentative strategies. We might fairly say,
for instance, that turn-of-the-century formalists are far more likely
than most others to construct their legal premises on the proper
definition of a term or the proper meaning of a concept, and that
they stand alone in their readiness to rely upon legal fictions. Legal
realists seem predisposed to construct legal premises by reference to
the particular factual circumstances of a case, to in-the-world policies
and purposes attributed to the authors of textual authority, and to
the decision-makers’ own understanding of the public interest, often
as informed by the social sciences. Members of the legal process
school, for their part, are distinguished by their propensity to
construct legal premises out of their understandings of neutral
principles, institutional competence, and purposive interpretation.
Proponents of law and economics, at least in its stronger versions,
are clearly marked by their commitment to the argumentative
premise that the justice is the maximization of aggregate wealth and
the promotion of allocative efficiency. In this sense, they are like the
legal realists except that, for them, the consequence that defines the
public interest is and only is the maximization of aggregate wealth.
In their turn, members of the positivist/analytic tradition are
predisposed to favor legal premises reflecting the right definition of a
term or the proper meaning of a concept; an understanding of
existing law in light of its presumed coherence or “integrity” or of its
“immanent rationality”; or the reading of cases in light of such
distinctions as “holding,” “dicta,” and “ratio decidendii.” And finally,
proponents of contemporary critical theory are predisposed in favor
of premises based upon their assertions that language is
indeterminate, that law is politics, and that much of what we take to
be natural is socially constructed.
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So short a catalogue cannot be comprehensive and cannot do
justice to the complexities, qualifications, and interrelationships that
inhere in this question. But it may be enough to suggest that there
exist identifiable affinities between, on the one hand, the six basic
systems of belief and, on the other, the interpretive strategies and the
forms of argument that may be brought to bear upon the law.
I.

The Possibility of the Rule of Law

There is perhaps nothing more central to legal theory than the
question of whether it is, as a practical matter, possible to achieve the
ideal we know as “the rule of law,” and the possibilities of having a
government of laws not men and of separating law from politics.
That ideal, of course, is the possibility that we be governed “not by
men but by laws.” It is an ideal that is closely associated with whatever
measure of legitimacy any particular system might be able to claim.
The range of views on the possibility of the rule of law can be seen
as arrayed along the same kind of continuum that we found in
connection with the possibility of neutral and objective reason. As in
that case, the continuum runs from the Faithful (some call them
credulous or cynical apologists) to the Skeptical (some call them
nihilists). Indeed there is a sense in which the range of views on the
possibility of the rule of law represents a summing of certain of the
differences already seen in connection with human nature (item D ),
the nature and possibility of language (item E), and the possibility of
reason (item F). Thus, for instance, those who see people as
fundamentally rational beings, who see language as a stable and
transparent bearer of meaning, and who have strong faith in the
possibility of reason are almost certain to have a high degree of faith
in the possibility of the rule of law. Accordingly, they will be
predisposed, when others are not, to see the existing order as fair and
legitimate. Similarly, those who do not see people as fundamentally
rational, who do not see language as a stable and transparent bearer
of meaning, and who are skeptical with respect to the possibility of
reason are likely to be highly skeptical about the possibility of the rule
of law.
J.

The Consequences of Speaking Against the Possibilities of Reason,
Objectivity, or the Rule of Law

On this question of consequences, one position, taken most
commonly by members of the legal process school, is that the tissue
of civility is thin and that disorder will engulf us if people become
persuaded that the existing system is unfair and illegitimate, or that
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the rule of law is a delusion or a sham. For these people, and in at
least a small degree they include most members of Team Faithful, the
disorder in question will bring with it chaos, inefficiency, and
violence.
This, of course, is not how the matter is understood by most
members of Team Skeptical. They will begin by arguing that the rule
of law is a sham, that the existing order is unfair and illegitimate, and
that illegitimate structures of domination are powerful and persistent.
But this is not just a matter of what may factually be the case but,
more precisely, of the consequences of expressing certain views.
Thus, both Professor Bickel and Dean Carrington have seemed not so
much to contest the truth of what the skeptics were saying as to
condemn them for saying such things because of the effects that flow
from such speech.260 On that question, the members of Team
Skeptical are likely to argue, and to believe, that the tissue of civility is
not so thin, and the risk of cynicism is not so great, as their
adversaries would suggest. And that speaking what for the skeptics is
the truth about these matters threatens nothing more serious than an
expansion of democracy, equality, or ethical responsibility.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions I draw from all this are decidedly modest. At the
beginning of the twenty-first century, American legal discourse is not
and cannot be understood as a single, seamless phenomenon. It can,
however, be reasonably well understood, and reasonably well learned,
in terms of the six theoretical perspectives that I have described.
Within each of those perspectives, arguments are carried on in a
more or less satisfactory way. Issues are joined, and there is general
agreement about what kind of reasons count and what kind of
arguments are taken to be valid. At least as a general matter,
differences are mutually intelligible, arguments are commensurable,
and standards are shared. Within any one of these legal perspectives,
there may be strong disagreements, but such disagreements go on
within the context of a stronger or at least larger set of agreements
and shared dispositions. Conditions are right for trusting that an
adversary’s arguments are made in good faith, for respect, and for
reciprocity.

260. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), supra note 73, at 82-84; Paul D.
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
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As between our legal theoretical perspectives, the conditions of
disagreement are infinitely less satisfactory. There is no general
agreement about what reasons count and what kinds of arguments
are valid.
Standards are not shared, arguments are
incommensurable, and, for the most part, issues are not joined. If
there is agreement on some point, it is accidental. One side offers an
argument that they know to be a winner and what they get in return
is a blank stare, a disrespectful dismissal of their argument, and
sometimes a charge of bad faith. As between these ships in the night,
it is sometimes genuinely the case that the minimal conditions of
civility do not exist.
What is to be done? Obviously I am of the view that one step in the
right direction is to acknowledge the deep differences within the
larger legal community; to give up the illusion that we are a single
community, which illusion is the source of so much disappointment;
to acknowledge the multiplicity of perspectives and to admit that
even our own perspective is both contingent and, what is harder,
contestable; and to seek out the origins and the intelligibility of those
perspectives which are most alien to us. At the risk of being
condemned as some kind of incurable romantic (but who else would
have attempted such a project as this?), I am deeply attracted to
Martin Buber’s suggestion that the place to begin is with a fuller and
more sympathetic appreciation of the other’s perspective and
position.261 It would seem to suggest that we might benefit from
suspending judgment and simply listening, from first appreciating
and then seeking to establish dialogue.
It would be a mistake to understand this as a simple call for civility
in discourse or, worse still, for a kind of unrestrained ethical
relativism. These things really matter, especially in law, which is a
field of such enormous in-the-world importance. And each of us
knows, in his heart of hearts, that he really is right and they really are
wrong. What interests me is the possibility that we could join issue
and have real arguments, and that we could do so not just with people
who share our most basic commitments but with those who do not.
That we could move towards a domain in which people thought
about, and offered reasons in support of, their most important
beliefs, including their beliefs that the existing order is or is not fair
and legitimate, that judges do or do not do what they say they are
doing, that order is or is not more important than democracy, that
justice is or is not the maximization of aggregate wealth—and in
261. See MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (1937).
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which people offered reasons and arguments in support of their
wildly disparate beliefs concerning the place of reason in people’s
lives or the determinacy of legal texts.

80

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1

